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2ABSTRACT
This thesis contains eleven chapters: introduction,
nine chapters on various aspects of the Kitab At-Tarbi* 
Wa-t-TadwIr of Jalji?, and conclusion. The Arabic text 
referred to is Charles Pellat's edition (Damas, 1955), 
which has been photocopied and added as appendix.
The Introduction discusses the form known as adab, 
and Chapter One deals with Ja^ii^'s version of it in this 
risala. Using syntagmatic analyses, and the identification 
of registers of discourse, an overall coherent texture 
is postulated.
Chapters Two and Three analyse the structure of passages 
of direct discourse, worded either by question or by report. 
Syntactic patterns are compared, as are semic fields, in 
an approach which will be followed throughout the thesis.
Chapters Four and Five isolate sections identified 
as indirect discourse, as argumentation presented through 
the problems of language.
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight deal with the intrusion 
of recipient, author, and text, and postulate a sophisticated 
literary function for these elements.
In Chapter Nine, on the basis of the primary identifi­
cations, the textual interdependence of discourse registers 
is treated by comparison with that in other literary forms, 
both ancient and modern.
In the Conclusion, based on the re-assembling of elements 
isolated in the analyses of Chapters One to Eight, the 
function and raison d'etre of this particular form is pres­
ented as a hypothesis about its relationship to expression 
of paradigmatic change.
The writing of this thesis would not have been possible 
without the generous assistance and advice for which I 
would like to express my thanks here. Drs M. Arkoun and 
J.E. Bencheikh have supported me with their interest, and 
Dr. Vincent Crapanzano has been especially helpful in textual 
matters. For careful typing acknowledgement is due to 
Mr. V. Daykin. Gratitude for endless patience and encourage­
ment is due to my son and daughter, and particularly to 
my supervisor, Dr. J. Wansbrough, the second Pierre Mdnard.
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9Introduction
THE RISALA 
0.1 Reference
The text I will analyse here is Charles Pellat's edition
— t ** 1of Le Kitab at-Tarbl* wa-t-TadwIr de Gafrig, published in 
1955. At the end of his introduction to this text, Pellat 
deplores the fact that no intelligent writers *aient point 
songd h  s'interroger sincerement et a fournir des rdponses 
raisonnables aux questions de Sahiz'.^ He identifies these 
questions as 'des problemes les plus ddlicats qui se posent 
a la conscience d'un musulman rationaliste du Illfe s. de
3
l ’Hegire.' Hence, what is implied are questions to which 
there are answers: problems of reference and identity.
0.1.1 Title - Recipient - Text
At their most superficial, problems of reference and
identity arise in connection with title, recipient (of the
'letter') and textual variants. Pellat is not happy with
the title, having seen it corroborated nowhere else. As
for the recipient, Pellat takes Jahiz's information in the
ic.
text at face value, and scrapes together historal anecdote 
for further clarification. The textual variants might be
1
I will refer to this text as the risala (letter) and will 
use the most simplified English transcription of the author's 
name, viz. Jahiz.
2
Pellat's introduction to the text, p. XVII.
3 Ibid., p . X-
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explained, as might the title, he thinks, by the whimsy of 
copyists; at any rate, the variants are appended as 
footnotes.
The major reference problem, however, concerns the material 
of the text itself, and what Pellat considers the main themes 
of the text: the questions posed. He provides, thus, an
extensive index of proper names deriving from 1le vieux 
fonds bddouin de ldgendes explicatives ou merveilleuses . . . 
les ldgendes empruntdes aux religions scriptuaires . . . 
mythes inventds par des Musulmans zdlds, le folklore Ydmdnite 
. . . les croyances mazddenes et manichdennes . . . le magie
i
chalddenne . . .  la mythologie shi'ite . . .'
Much of this material is treated by Pellat as potential 
accretions to an earlier, purer Islam. He explains its appear­
ance as reflecting various groups* concern with their political
2
position (‘Adnanite supremacy), religious orthodoxy {'pour
3
expliquer quelques obscuritds du Coran et de la Sunna'); 
or scientific competence ('probldmes qui se prdsentent A 
1*esprit des Musulmans enclins a s'interroger sur les mysteres
4
de la Nature). Represented here, then, are elements for 
contexts in which legitimacy or order may be found.
Reference problems, however, run into identity problems 
in his glossary of common nouns, as these issues slide into 
the definitions of words. Thus, many of the problems high­
lighted are those assumed to separate a man of Mu'tazili 
views (author) from a man of Shi'i views (recipient). For 
instance, both the entry on the 'long-lived' ( and
1 Ibid., p. XV.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. XIV.
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that on ‘metamorphosis' ( ) are connected by Pellat with
the mythology of the life and death of Shi*i imams.
0.1.2 Author
There are two ways of approaching this problem of identity 
or definition of words. The first involves certain assumptions 
about the author which lead to an appropriate reading of 
his text. The second requires an investigation of the text 
itself, and its internal dynamics. Taking the first approach, 
Pellat, a known expert on Jahiz, sees several of his charac­
teristics in this text: as rationalist and sceptic (though
1
not very original because influenced by the Greeks)^ he puts 
in question as much as possible; also, as competent ironist,
2he paints a portrait (of the recipient) worthy of La Bruyere.
However, this ironic style creates disorientation, by 
the impression of multiple registers of discourse. Specific­
ally, the whole 'debate' with the recipient of the letter 
is seen by Pellat as one of 'deux parties qui s'imbriquent 
l'une dans 1'autre sans aucun plan prdcongu, sans aucun ordre
3
visible'. More generally, not only is Jahiz reputed to 
have a style in which ' le coq & l'ctne fait partie de sa
4
maniere', but Pellat feels that in this text, he wrote 'au
fil de la plume et accumulant les id£es qui lui viennent 
5a 1'esprit'.
0.1.3 *Adab *
In fact, Jahiz is characterized as being, perhaps, the
Ibid., p. XVI.
Ibid., p. X.
Ibid., p. XIV.
Ibid., p. V.
Ibid., p. XIV.
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originator of the genre called 'Adab', whose style is consid-
ered an amassing of a 'variety' of elements in 'random'
1 2 order, and which 'does not require the taking of a stand'.
So, on the one hand, there are the views of Jahiz here, but,
on the other hand, this type of text, by its excess of
referential elements, apparent lack of subordination, and
unsteady semantic focus, cannot represent views.
Pellat's solution is to establish his own focus, by
hierarchies of reference and relationship, indicating the
areas of primary concern, ‘le texte essential, les questions,
« 3qui constituent la raison d'etre du Tarbi*' with a heavy 
vertical line, those of questionable authorship with a dotted 
line, and those of 'neutral' standing with no mark at all.
4
This leads to an admittedly partial text, along the following 
lines:
author 'view' -► signification of words = 'excess' 
words -> partial text
0.2 Identity
0.2.1 Signification
Taking the words and their signification as the vital 
link in the above equation, and approaching the text instead 
through its internal dynamics, in order to arrive at signif­
ication, the question arises: which dominates, a word or
its context? Examples from a few 'neutral' paragraphs at
T
I. Goldziher, A Short History of Classical ArabiaC 
Literature (Hildesheim, 1966), p. 82.
2
G. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam (Chicago, 1971), p. 251.
3 Pellat, o? cit., p. VIII.
4 A
Compare J.M. Cohen's introduction to Cervantes, Don 
Quixote (London, 1954), p. 17: 'My advice to anyone who
finds himself bogged down by . . . is to skip it . . . then 
to read on from . . .  to skip the . . . and to cut out the
I
13
the end of the risala indicate that there are obvious glos­
sary problems in this edition, and criteria of definition 
are unclear.
0.2.2 Definition
(a) word and different contexts: § 196, word { )
use in § 196: (
glossary definition for § 196: 'forme, genre'
glossary definition for §72: 1 ressemblance1
my comment: by context (paired opposition with
‘contraries') definition for § 72 is more 
appropriate.
(b) word and pairing context: § 198, words j )
use in § 1 9 8 : ( I J i L  N ^  JU \
glossary definitions for § 198:
1 transendant, inaccessible' ( )
'subtil, ddlicat' ( jj-ij) 
glossary comment for §198, under ( ) : 1 opp. k  ( <3-5 J ) '
my comment: this (pairing) context might imply
opposition, but the definitions do not.
(c) word and wrong context: § , word ( » -*■ )
use in § 203: J i— li ^  . . .)
/
glossary definition for § .: 'devenir blancs,
chevaux' (— <--L;) 
my comment: from this context (of opposition to
'unmixed') a preferable form is: 'to mix'
( wLi )
These problems in the glossary seem to stem from assump­
tions that definitions of words are either static, or
determined by a style which automatically pairs by opposition 
or identity, or of little significance, since they appear
14
in paragraphs which are not considered of major interest.
In the above examples, I purposely chose words from ‘neutral' 
paragraphs to underline the fact that signification of words 
in a text depends on their use in the whole of that text 
(syntagmatic relationships), as well as the nuances they may 
have carried with them into that text (paradigmatic relation­
ships) . This means looking at overall syntactic manipulations 
and consequent semic fields, and so I propose to use 
‘structuralist’ principles for my analysis.
0.2.3 Structuralism
This approach will be based on principles drawn from: 
Saussure, Jakobson, Valery, and Todorov, in the following 
way:
From Saussure's principles, I take the idea of the 
arbitrary linguistic sign; 'The bond between the signifier
I
i 1
and the signified is arbtrary' -
A
also, the idea of signification by opposition;
'Language is characterized as a system based on the opposition
2
of its concrete units1
and the primacy of syntagmatic relationships* 'In fact, 
spatial coordinations help to create associative 
coordinations.13
From those of Jakobson, I extend Saussure's linguistic 
axes, of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic,into conceptual 
axes: the axis of 'combination' related to 'discours
contextuel', the axis of 'selection' related to 'operations
_
F. de Saussure, A Course in General Linguistics (New 
York, 1966), p. 67.
3 Ibid., p. 105.
3 Ibid., p. 128.
15
1
mdtalinguistiques'.
From a reflection by Valery, I extend principles of 
language into literature; 'La liit^rature est, et ne peut 
pas dtre autre chose qu'une sorte d 1extension et
2
d 'application de certaines propridtds du language'.
And, finally, from Todorov, I adopt a particular manner
of negating the form/content dichotomy; 'Le langage . . .
3
est & la fois m£diateur et m£diatisd1.
4
In this way, I intend to use the 'particular' style 
of Jahiz to analyse his risala.
R. Jakobson, Langage enfantin et aphasie (Paris, 1980), p.142.
2
Quoted in Todorov, Poetigue de la Prose (Paris, 1971), p. 32.
 ^ Todorov, op. cit., p. 32.
 ^ C. Pellat (ed.), The Life and Works of Jahiz (London, 1969), 
p. 18.
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Chapter One
THE CASE - I: THE WORLD
1.1 Statement
As mentioned in the introduction, the genre called 'Adab'
is a problematical one, and is probably best translated as
'belles-lettres’. Unfortunately this term is accompanied
by an aura of ephemera, and in the Arabic version, the
impression is often that what statement there is vacillates
between antonymies, becomes bogged down in repetitions,
and ends up stasis. Therefore, one of the first problems
I want to consider is style and argument, taking a passage
1
between pages 65 and 70. This deals with the 'argument* 
on 'joking' ( ) and 'seriousness' ( . Pellat's
sure feel for the language, in dividing the text into para­
graphs, marks out, here, 9 discursive units (§§115-123),
5 of which examine the argument from one point of view, 4 from 
another.
1.1.1 Stasis
(a ) antonymy
In the first 5 paragraphs, 115-119, there is an impression 
of stasis because of Jahiz‘s use of a large number of evenly 
balanced opposing terms. Paragraph 116 is a good example, 
the first half contains antonymial nouns:
affluence ( ) vs need (3^ -U- )
From now on, I will refer only to paragraphs, not to pages.
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recuperation ( p M " ) vs.
w
love { "
comfort ( ) "
The second contains antonymial verbs 
distinguish from it vs.
( )
to relax ) "
to jest ( Jj-* ) "
aggrandize ) 1
to rest ( "
fatigue ( )  
hatred ( )  
affliction ( )
share with it (^Li )
to exert oneself ( )
m
to be serious ( ^ )
w
debase ( JJ Jc ) 
to toil ( j5*)
This impression of stasis is reinforced by Jahiz's use of 
redundant synonyms or outright repetitions, to provide a 
neutral ground for the antonymial elements. An example of 
this can be seen in paragraph 115: 
to go along ( till**) =
ways ( )
different ( iAJLLi*) 
to claim ( ^ ) 
all )
two halves ( )
1.1.2 Movement
to go (w-fc j ) 
senses ( &  
opposing (SjU.) 
to claim ( ^  ) 
all
two parts ( )
1
(a) synonymy
However, it is also by synonymy that Jahiz dissolves 
stasis, and furthers the argument, enlarging the space of 
each contested word, or pair of words, by their association 
with others. This is sometimes done by infection through 
contiguity, as in the following ways:
For the recurrent ideas of dissolution, collapse, dead­
end, see below: 2.1.2(c), 7.3, and 10.1.2(b).
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Pby a shared (identical) conjlement;
§116: 'joking' ( ) is called 'recuperation' ( )
§118: 'permissible' ( £-1*) is called 'recuperation'
(
by a shared (synonymous) verb:
§119: 'remembering* (j^ ) - ' to be wretched' ( )
'seriousness' ( ^ )  - ' to be broken' (*^Ll)
by a shared (identical) association:
«v
§119: 'joking and seriousness ( ?-[>Jl)
; \'withholding and spending >- 'path' ( J .. )
( J I?  ^^
(b) analogy
Jahiz, sometimes, on the other hand, brings about this 
synonymity by infection through analogy:
explicit, by the particle ‘just as* (LS*):
§118:'joking has its place - just as - seriousness 
has its place (. * . l
just as ( uf) . . .
withholding has its validity - as - spending has
its validity' ( a— **- J JLJ ^  i ^ t)
implicit, by the phrase 'and on that' (dJ J J l*>);
§119: 'seriousness' vs. 'joking'
'spending' vs. 'withholding!^  ^ T ( dJ j
( J 1 J I)  'P a th '
'contraction' vs. 'expansion'  ^ ^
(u^l) ‘course1
(c) space
So Jahiz advances the argument, by enlarging the space 
of words that at first seemed static and univocal in their
19
antonymial pairings. However, each paragraph here has a 
version of stasis at the end, precisely in the enlarging of 
space, there occurs the collapse of antonymies. Schematic­
ally, it appears thus:
§115i Jahiz's way:
all sides will be heard, X's as well as Y ‘s 
§ 116; way of the world:
people only do X to achieve Y 
(§117: order:
can X affect Y?)^
§ 11 8; God 1 s way:
X has become like Y 
§ 11 9: way of Nature:
X co-exists with Y 
It is clear that in all of these paragraphs, with perhaps 
the exception of ^ 117, X and Y co-exist.
1.2 Registers of Discourse : Case
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the disorient­
ing aspects of the risala is the impression of different 
registers of discourse, and the further problematic of their 
interdependence. I intend to treat this in a positive manner,
attempting an identification of these different registers in
2
terms of Andr£ Jolles' 'Simple Forms', with the idea that
it is these identifications which will then clarify depend-
3encies of discourse, and eventual signification. Thus,
_
This paragraph can be related to the following issues: 
excess and limit, see below: 6.2 
hyperbole, blame, and act, see below: 7:4 
causality and contiguity, see below: 5.2.2.
2
A. Jolles, Formes Simples (Paris, 1972).
3
I also intend to indicate, by occasional footnotes, various 
recurrent elements which create discourse dependencies.
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before any further analysis of the collapses just described 
and the associations which make them possible, one should 
consider the overall form of argument here. Collapse does 
not appear in the next four paragraphs; the material there 
is anecdote, and the paragraphs do not conclude in terms 
of general principles, but in terms of specific testimony. 
Paragraphs 115 to 123 thus seem divided by their nature at 
paragraph 120; however, they belong together as two differ­
ent points of view within the 'simple form' Jolles calls
i
the Case.
1.2.1 Evaluation
In the Case, issues, or antinomial terms such as those 
mentioned earlier, are set up in opposition and evaluated.
An appropriate vocabulary emerges in the following.paragraphs 
§117:
'in these scales' ^  )
'in this estimation' ( j-j&JI IJla 
'overstepping the extent'
'cutting between* { )
§118:
'balancing between* J ^ )
 ^ 'equals it' )
'differs from it (
Furthermore, it is one of the characteristics of the Case 
that this is a quantitative evaluation, 'le cas . . . mesure
des quantitds, ou plut6t, elle les p&se'. Evaluative
\
vocabulary is thus matched by quantitative vocabulary:
Op. cit.
2 Ibid., p. 140.
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§115:
'most of it' ( d^ 5t)
'least of it' ( Jif)
'two parts' )
‘two halves' ( (j ILaJ )
§116:
'surplus' ( J-^)
§117:
'excess'
§120: a vertiginous repetition of:
' sums ' ( J*->- )
'unit1 )
' masses' (
'multitude'
'all' ( ^ r )
1.2.2 Norms
Another characteristic of the Case is the norms it sets 
up to evaluate these antonymies. When writing of stories 
in which evaluation of a case is difficult, Jolles says,
'. . . o n  reclame pourtant des normes: le domaine des
sensations, du sentiment, du g6ut'. Here, 'sentiment' appears 
only rarely, as in
§116: ' hate ' 1) vs . ' love' ( I )
'Gdut' appears only in the extended understanding of:
§116: beauty of state' ( JUJ!
§117: ludicrous repetitions of: 'ugly' { ) and
'uglier' (
It is by the norm of 'sensation' that most evaluation is 
made, as seen in the rich vocabulary listed under 'antonymy' 
(1 .1 .1 ).
Ibid., p. 153.
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1.2.3 Order
These norms are used for the evaluation of the merits 
of 'joking1 and 'seriousness', of their share of:
§115:
' good' I)
‘evil' { JLfJI)
For this, there is:
§116:
'a defender' (
'a preferrer' )
§118:
'recompense' (
Were there not:
§119: God's provision of:
'the correct . . . the real . . . the true
( (3^ *^  ^ *-UaJ I . . . , l^aJ I )
'purely . . . simply . . . broadly 
{ ... U __  )
'surely the masses would perish' ( I dJL^ J )
'and the order of the dlite would fade away
1.3 Witness
1.3.1 Internal
Despite this lexical mixture of the judicial and moral, 
this is not argumentation of an either/or type. On a cosmic 
level, the way of the world (end §116) and the way of nature 
(end §119) by association, support the order of God, the 
moral order. This type of synonymy allows collapse of
For imbalance and norm, see below: 6.3.2 and 9.3.2.
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antonymies at all levels. Hence, for instance, in paragraph
119, the $act that a 'stream' ) (world of nature) is
of constant 'expansion' and 'contraction' implies that in
its relationship to 'joking' and 'seriousness' (world of
discourse) and 'withholding' and 'spending' (world of
culture), their oppositions may, equally, co-exist.
This sense of order in balance, not in exclusion, is
the 'morale Equilibriste' which Jolles identifies as
'casuistics1, or the use of the case in moral theology,
. . . 1 ‘opposition me par&it nette entre cette morale 
et une scolastique qui cherchait, autant que possible 
a apprehender les vertus et les vices comme objets, 
et il me parci.it tout aussi net que cette Evaluation 
se voulait parfaitement humaine.
1.3.2 External
Casuistics had as one of its main tenets that.of 'prob-
abilism', and in a passage from I. von Dollinger cited by
Jolles, it is clear that in the absence of absolute certainty,
probabilism recognized external as well as internal argument:
1. . . c'est h dire sur 1'autoritE des gens considErEs comme 
3
compEtents'. Thus, this is the other point of view; para-
4
graphs 121 to 123 will argue it from external witness.
Though these later paragraphs might at first look like 
arbitrary anecdote, there is progression in the argument, 
which can be seen if one follows it paragraph by paragraph, 
extracting, again, the antonymies, the particular conceptual 
oppositions.
(a) general-particular
These conceptual oppositions differ from the preceding
For exclusion by reduction in argument, see below: 5.3.1.
2
Jolles, op. cit., p. 155.
 ^ Ibid., p . 156.
4
For another manifestation of this, see below: 3.2.
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antonymial pairs in that they are not explicit, but they 
are none the less operative. Paragraph 120 is a transitional 
paragraph, marking the switch from argument by internal merit 
to that of external witness. Jahiz sets up the general claims 
of people, and then exposes his own individual claims:
( J . . . I jJ-j 151 )
He scrambles, by repetitions, words for general and particular 
(. . . <u U . . .
and then caps this by two single lines from anonymous poets. 
Thus, from the general consensus there is movement to 
particular testimony.
(b) Arab-Islamic
In the next paragraph, the contrast is again between
the general, many groups (Arab) and the particular, one leader
(Muhammad), with the added issue of the relationship between
name and event. If (otherwise) anonymous groups were given
sobriquets for scowling and laughing (unattested event)(. what
about Muhammad, who joked (attested event) but was not named
a *great joker' ( }* )? This'Sfollowed by the attested, three
A,
obscure jokes by Muhammad. From the unattested event there 
is movement to the attested event.
(c) public-private
The next paragraph, 122, follows up the previous mention 
of community leaders and is more specific. Event is broken 
down into public versus private, leaders broken down into 
virtuous versus un-virtuous. Commentary moves from the 
general mention (unnamed event) of *Ali, to the specific 
quote (named event) by al-Hajjaj. At the end of this para­
graph there is the type of collapse seen before, that of 
indulgence: Jahiz points out that he has included all manner
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of men in his argument for joking.
i
(d) world-leader-community
This spirit of indulgence is what will now be elaborated
in the next paragraph, 123, and it is worth more detail,
2
albeit schematic, as it is a good example of the way the 
argument progresses in this section.
1 norm of sensation:
ease-unrestraint
2 order of nature:
branch-bough
3 Muhammad-concepts-general
positive: magnanimous religion
negative: contradiction-harshness
4 Muhammad-words-indirect
(a) general implementation: 
spread peace-good tidings
(b) specific implementation:
exchange visits-shake hands-exchange presents
5 Muhammad-acts-general
laugh smilingly-not disapprove, laughingly
6 Muhammad-words-direct:
be courteous to companions
time of eating, drinking, diversion
7 Muhammad-acts-specific
his family: not reprove servant girl's drumming
his 'origins’: not reprove Arab (named) tracking
8 order of nature - nature of Arab (unnamed): honey
-
For community as brotherhood, see below: 3.2.2.
2
Normally, I expect to provide the Arabic words from the 
text for my intentionally literal translations, but here 
supplying the Arabic would be tantamount to recopying the 
whole paragraph.
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Thus, in these last paragraphs of external witness, 
anecdote not only cannot be confused with stasis, but its 
argument can be seen to move from the general (joking) to 
the particular (jokes), from the unattested event (laughing) 
to the attested event (laughed), from the Arab (poets, groups) 
to the Islamic (community leaders, Muhammad), all developed 
as witness for the side in a certain 'case*. Also, it is 
interesting to note that though there are textual variants 
for the last word in the second section, 'honey' (J^JI ) 
seems appropriate to me, as it brings the discussion full 
circle back to nature, and is a second statement on mutual 
compatibilities, already seen in the paragraphs of internal 
witness, viz. nature-man-God.
In conclusion, the 'joking' versus 'seriousness' issue 
which might at first seem repetitious in its terms and static 
in its argument ('Adab' problem) is, rather, a dynamic 
argument. The first part is 'case' by internal evidence, 
argued through explicit antonymial elements whose scope is 
expanded by the infections of synonymy, and whose conclusions 
are in line with generalist principles of endoxy, 'the way 
of the world'. The second part is 'case* by external witness, 
argued through implicit contrasts whose scope is contracted 
toward the specific: time, place, person, event, the partic-
ularist bases of 'orthodoxy', the path of Islam. The 
linguistic manipulations and conceptual subordinations 
identified here in the register of 'case' will be studied 
in every chapter as manifestations of other registers.
To be compared with the trajectory of 'historical' data 
on the subject of singing girls: A.F.L. Beeston (ed), The
Epistle on Singing Girls by Jahiz (Warminster, 1980).
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Chapter Two
THE RIDDLE
2.1 The Questions
The questions in this text have already been mentioned 
in connection with index and glossary, reference and identity. 
Pellat sees them as a problem of identification and differ­
entiation. In other words, addressing himself ostensibly
to correction of the recipient of the letter, Ahmad cAbd
1 2 al-Wahhab, a known Rafiglite, Jahiz would identify heterodox
Shi'i material in order to disparage it. However,'from the
index and glossary it is clear that considerably more than
merely Shi'i material is treated in these questions, and
it becomes difficult to know how to deal with these dangling
facts and figures, this plethora of anti-information.
2.1.1 Information - Litany - Category
There are several possible approaches and as examples
1 will use two blocks of paragraphs : j}63 to 77 and^l 3 3 to 
138, following themes in their argument, as well as the 
switches within or between discourse register. The initial 
approach to this material might be to see it as simple trans­
mission of information. Thus, in the first sequence of para­
graphs the main subject is varieties of divination, and the
main questions asked are: ‘who’ and 'what*. Because the
_ —  
Referred to from now on as A.W.
2 Pellat, op. cit., p. XVI.
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names and terms have become no less arcane with time, one
is immediately dependent on Pellat1s index and glossary.
However, here one is struck by the fact that the ever-present
authority for Jahiz's material is Jahiz himself, mainly from
another work, K. al-Hayawan. In fact, Pellat cites a passage
there in which Jahiz states that these works are complementary.
Of course, there are also later authorities who use this
material, but one cannot be sure that their source was not
also Jahiz. Finally, there is the simple fact that there
are many terms which Pellat was never able to trace at all.
Thus, as information, this material is problematical,
but there is another approach to these questions. The litany
of names of people and things, supposedly replying to 'who'
and 'what' has conjuring power. These have been named,
2therefore they exist. They are also presented as names 
about whom one might make some judgement:
§63; 'where was . . . with respect to . . .'
{. . . ) 
or about which the letter’s recipient has already made some 
judgement:
§63: 'why did you decide in favour of . . .'
{ .  . . ^  . C 1^ 3,9 J j  J
This relationship, of course, would lead one to think that 
the issue figured in the 'Shu‘ubi' controversies, but this 
must be considered by those who turn their attention to the 
paradigmatic, the non-linear, open-ended, unordered associ­
ations outside the text.
My approach here is limited to the syntagmatic: the
Ibid., p . X I .
See below: 4.1 and 4.4.4.
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linear, limited, 'ordered' exposition of the text. Within
these limits, however, there is also the possibility that
Jahiz, thought to be 'Greek influenced', was formulating
some set of categories. Is there an attempt to arrive at
an essence of things through their classification in the 
-]
text? For this particular set of paragraphs, that hypothesis 
is unlikely. Since the category replying to 'who' is gen­
erally individual diviners, demons and legendary figures, 
and the category replying to 'what' is methods of divination, 
kinds of demons and relics of legendary figures, one can 
discern some genus/species relationship, but it is at best 
evanescent.
2.1.2 Deciphering
There is yet another approach to these questions 
syntagmatically; that is, not as background for an order 
of categories, but as an order of its own. Jahiz seems to 
be answering his own questions as he proceeds. First of 
all, the dominant subject matter of this section is divin­
ations, or deciphering, a particular way of going about 
knowing things. Secondly, though this is treated in terms 
of simple identifications ('who'/ 'what') such identification 
is actually put in question in three ways.
(a) ambiguity
One of these ways lies in ambiguity of identities. In 
paragraph 7 3 there is a series of things which are hybrids: 
within and between the animal and plant kingdoms:
(ii )
in other words: X plus Y
In paragraph 70, it is a matter not of double form, but of
For classification, see below: 5.3.1(c).
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change of form, where there are different types of change: 
'materializing* . . . 'changing colour* (
and demonic changes:
'the transformation of Iblis into the form of . . . 
and the form of* (. . ^
in other words, X into Y 
Sometimes this identity problem is even articulated on the 
basic level of polysemy:
§6 3: 'Siqq* as proper noun (<3-^ )
§6 4: 'Siqq* as common noun 'hemisphere* {i5-^  ) 
in other words, X = x?
(b) redundancy
A second way in which identities are undermined is in 
auditory redundancies, resulting from the slurs of homophony. 
Congruence of sound puts in question (in)congruence of sign:
§66: (j
La • * « d La f
§69:
i>s .y * * • o-i
§63: L  . . . eL^J1
Even if it is granted that some of these are folk homophonies 
which Jahiz used, their sing-song effect is anyway quite 
apparent, and tends to dissolve individual identities.
(c) collapse
The third way in which identities are undermined is
by collapse and inconsequence. In paragraph 73, this is 
y
done b^ f anticlimax: the paragraph begins with questions
on hybrids, proceeds through strange events of nature, signs
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by wild animals, knowledge of the occult, to a last question 
about the acts of two domesticated farm animals.
Anticlimax appears again in paragraph 77; the sequence 
consists of questions: to identify names, to identify
qualities, to identify species, to identify reasons, then 
to identify the difference between two homophonous things: 
'the dish and the glass' ( UaJI )
Pellat himself says this must be a ‘jeu de mots'.
Paragraph 66 also concludes with a dead-end, instead of 
loss of identity by collapse in similar sound, it presents 
loss of identity —  by similar effect —  for one thing. After 
questions on names of ancient idols, places, things, 
treasures, fame, Jahiz turns to the paradox of:
'that wealth which, he who takes of it repents, and 
he who leaves it alone repents'
( ^  •0—. Cj*? f | ^  JLJI J I e!J j)
2.2. Register: The Riddle
2.2.1 Catechism
This enigmatic phrase is useful for conjecture on the
discourse register of these paragraphs. Questions in terms
of deciphering identities have been largely unrewarding,
and may cover another type of interrogation, another level
of inquiry. There are two main points Jolles makes about
the Riddle. The first is that it is a matter of catechism;
there is a knowledge already extant, 'le savoir comme 
2possession' and it is up to the questioned to show himself
master of it to the questioner. This 'savoir' is ostensibly
the aim of the search, but even more so is the master of it,
Jolles, op. cit., p. 113.
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as Claude Brdmond writes, '1'enqudte ici . . . consiste &
chercher, non la vdritd d'une chose, mais la personne qui
i
sait la vdritd des choses.' So, when Jahiz announces, in 
paragraph 4:
'that I ask him hundreds of questions, jestingly, 
and let the people know the extent of his ignorance
I
• • •
( ^  ^ ^ i y * U  1 1  ^ ( dJ Lm4 £L< I* t dJ Lu 1 ^  ^  )
it means that if one person is shown to be ignorant, the 
other is not, and attention is solicited for answers by 
Jahiz, as much as questions to A.W.
2.2.2 Language
Jolles' second point about the Riddle is that this
knowledge is articulated through a special language. He
quotes Porzig who differentiates between a common language
in which things are understood as phenomena (a foot is an
appendage) and a special language in which their function
2
must be detected (a foot functions as support). Though
Aristotle commented on the affiliation between metaphor and
riddle, 'on peut tirer de bonnes mdtaphores des dnigmes bien
faites, car les mdtaphores impliquent des dnigmes' probably
on the basis of their common ground in polysemy, the element
of resemblance is lacking here. As C.F. Menestrier writes,
'c'est a dire qu'elle cesse d'etre ressemblance parce que
d'abord on y ddcouvre des rdpugnances et des contraridtds,
en quoi consiste le mystdre des dnigmes.'4 In other words,
-
C. Brdmond, 'Pourquoi le poisson a ri', Podtique, 45 
(Paris, 1981) ,p.12.
2
Quoted in Jolles, op. cit., p. 115.
3
Aristote, La Rhdtorique, III (Paris, 1980),r 45.
4 r
C.F. Menestrier, 'Podtique de l'dnigme', Podtique, 45 
(Paris , 1 981) ,f>. 42 .
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there is a deliberate discrepancy between the ostensible leyel 
of address in a riddle and its special one. It is, therefore, 
possible that in this case 'question' itself floats up from 
phenomenon: 'who is . . . ' t o  function 'how is . . Testing
this hypothesis, is a first reading, as phenomenon, undermined, 
and, if so, is a second reading, as function, suggested?
Both implicitly and explictly Jahiz undermines the inter­
rogative 'who'. Among the ways mentioned above, is anticlimax 
at the end of sequences? In paragraph 63, for instance, 
he asks about the figures who built the great monuments, the 
sequence then goes on to those who tell about such things: 
poetesses, historiographers, genealogists, then dissolves 
in a homophony, and finally ends with trackers and guides: 
from monument to mark in the sand; the real question is, 
how are these things known?
This is implicitly stated, but two paragraphs later, in
$65, Jahiz is quite explicit. Here, he pursues the problem of
knowledge of an identity in connection with the identity of 
the letter's recipient, A.W. This begins with identity as 
defined through A.W.'s emotions:
'you feared to be Ibn Sa*id . . . you hoped to be the 
Daj jal'
( Cx' O^
but produces immediate confusion as Ibn Sa'id was called 
the Dajjal (collapse: two names, one identity). This present­
ation of mental confusion proceeds through general doubt,
Jahiz's doubt, a positive statement: of a negative identity,
and concludes with Jahiz*s suppositions.
This disparagement of A.W.'s way of knowing things con­
tinues in paragraph 67, but is argued in different terms. As
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1
will be mentioned later, one of the narrative feints Jahiz
d
uses is a suden switch of discourse register. Here, the A
linguistic features indicate a resumption of the 'case1: it
is a series of statements containing coordinations by ‘as*
(I S) and subordinations by 'so' (-i) and 'until . . . became
(o,Ls> f a technique which is not found in the paragraphs 
containing 'who1/'what' questions. Its function here is to 
underline the fact that what is being argued is a question 
of knowledge and its bases. The subject is comment on A.W.'s
2
knowledge of the correct from the false by dint of having seen
mankind since 'created' ( ^*) and things both 'unmixed and
mixed' ( . Jahiz' s irony indicates that he does
3
not consider such empiricism any more conclusive than identi­
fications by reply to 'w h o '/'what'.
2.3 Answers
2.3.1 Criteria - Logic - Allusion
If the subject of deciphering and interrogation by 'who'/ 
'what' are dead-ends, one might ask whether Jahiz presents 
an alternative catechism, in an alternative language. Because 
of its insistent questions, the paragraphs 133 to 138 seem 
similar to the first set (63-77). However, it is clear that 
in many ways they are different. First of all, questions 
by 'how'/'why' take precedence over ‘who'/’what'. Secondly, 
the criteria of permissibility and possibility appear:
See below: 7.3.1.
2
For a delightful modern version, see the 'testimony of 
Qfwfq in CosmicoTiics, by Italo Calvino.
3
See below: 5.1.
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§136:
'how was it allowed' ( ^ L * U lS )
'is it permissible' ( )
'possible' (
Thirdly, conclusion is reached by logical argument and 
consequence:
§136: 'despite' ( f )
§138: ' so . . . so . . .' (. . . i. . . J)
The fourth difference is that in this section, there is
more alluding to people and less naming than in the other 
part. The question of context in the Riddle is an interesting 
one, for it is precisely lack of context which creates ambi­
valence of interpretation, and this appears in two different
ways here. The staccato series of reference (and their con­
fusion of identity) in the first part, unconnected to any 
context, ends by creating an impression of the comic and 
inconsequential. In the second part, on the other hand, 
what is stressed is consequence, and so the missing referential 
items beg to be supplied, in order precisely to create meaning 
by context.
*
A further difference is the fact that the general subject 
treated here is not diviners, but prophets. Also, instead 
of ambiguity by confusion of identities (hybrids, changes 
of form, homophonies, dead-ends) there is choice, which lies 
in conceptual subordination. Briefly and schematically, one 
finds the following oppositions:
§133: tricks vs. precedents
§134: names - no beliefs vs. beliefs - no names
§135: the correct - acceptance vs. signs - withdrawal
§136: prophet vs. 'imam1
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§137 communal religion vs. individual belief
§138 religion vs. violence
2 . 3 . 2 ecognition
What is evident in these choices is that there are two 
criteria implied. First, there is the accomplished event, 
in the sense of 'the way things are'. This underlies argument 
by number in paragraph 136, by situation in 137, and by state 
precedent in 138. Secondly, this event is communally realized, 
as seen notably in paragraphs 135 and 137. Furthermore, 
paragraph 137 is a good example of its embedding: from ques­
tions of 'how' and 'why' one Hears mention of ancient peripheral 
Arab kingdoms and religions (of the Book and otherwise), 
then mention of Central Arab groupings according to patterns 
of veneration vis-a-vis Mecca, then mention of no such communal 
groupings for those of Dahri (eternalist/materialist) beliefs - 
no nation, no prophet, no king: only the dead-end of the
anomalous.
Initially, this discourse seemed one of reference, multiple 
facts and figures to be identified and differentiated. In the 
two passages I have analysed here, I would suggest that it is
m  <_r ^
an epistemological search, not a factual one, and the latter
A
serves as foil for the former. In one language of the Riddle, 
Jahiz treats the problem of deciphering negatively, limiting 
his questions to identifications of phenomena, through 'who'/ 
'what', and to lists with dead-end conclusions, readings 
by individuals on individuals. In the other language of the 
Riddle, he treats the problem of recognition positively, extend­
ing the questions to conceptual justifications by 'how'/'why', 
and to conclusions by logic: the 'historical' realizations
of collective memory.
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Chapter Three
MEMORABILIA
3.1 Quotation - Controversy
The same use of reference, exhibited in facts and figures 
in the Riddle, occurs in Jahiz1s use of quotations. They 
usually appear as support in 'controversy', and as quotations 
of others play a powerful role as witness, so it is worth 
analysing two separate manifestations of this in the text, 
namely, in paragraphs 5-8, and 190-194. I intend to look, 
briefly, at this manifestation of authority as a problem 
of source inside and outside the text, then to analyse the 
exposition of argument by such quotations, and, finally, 
to identify their discourse register.
In the first section (paras X - 8 ) , the ostensible use 
ers
of controversy is a deficiency of A.W. , in this particular 
case, his 'devotion to dispute' ( Ui^J) . The failings
of A.W. are, from the very first paragraph, the point of 
departure of the whole risala, but this section, by going 
into the problem of 'dispute' through quotation affects a
transition from concern with A.W. to concern with issues
\
per se.
At the end of the risala, the second section (paras 
190-194) is, again, inspired by deficiency in A.W., this 
time his ignorance. Jahiz presents as 'conclusion*
'questions' (. . . 1 ^ ^  about knowledge. These
questions (vizt quotations) are followed by further reference
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to controversy (para. 196) ( jJ) and A.W.'s obtuseness
( and so bring one full circle back to A.W. as focus.
3.2 Community
3.2.1 Authority
(a) Jahiz's sources
For the first section, I will give the sources of almost 
each quote as I present the development of argument, para­
graph by paragraph. The relationship of argument and source 
is not without interest here. On the whole, there is a 
selection of unnamed 'poets', and named early community 
figures, in other words: sources of Arab and Islamic tradition.
(b) Pellat's sources
It would be safest to think of these quotations as, 
above all, exemplary, if one considers the difficulty Pellat 
had in corroborating them. This is the result of his 
research:
Paragraph 5: some of the anonymous quotes were left out
of other editions of the risala; one is cited in Maidani, 
and those with named sources are either to be found only 
in other writings of Jahiz, or were not found by Pellat. 
Paragraph 6: all of the sources here are unnamed, and of
these quotes one is undiscovered, one found in Jahiz, two 
cited by Maidani, and one by Tha*alibi.
Paragraph 7: all were undiscovered, except one - in Jahiz,
again.
Paragraph 8 very definitely quotes Surah 96, verse 19, but 
all the other quotes were undiscovered.
It is quite clear that the only quotes Pellat did find cited 
outside Jahiz's works were those of the anonymous (§5,£6) 
and the poets (§6).
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3.2.2 Argument
The quotes in these paragraphs are elicited by a
^ i's f t-vf'
keyword: in this section, it is 'discord' Because
of this repetition of a word, it may initially seem that
argument does not advance. However, the semic field is
c
constantly enlarged by synonymic ontagions, a phenomenon
A
already discussed in Case I. Though separation by para­
graph is only a convenience, in each one there is a percep­
tible change of emphasis or focus. Therefore, I will 
present each paragraph as argument in changing terms, with
t
anitheses to be regarded as its positive and negative poles, 
and accretion of synonyms on both sides, moving the argument 
from one field to the next.
§5:
argument in terms of man's relation to man 
keyword: 'dispute ■ Cbj)
negative 
anonymous sources:
synonyms for dispute, 
enmity and power:
'be strong', 'dis­
agreement', 'insult1,
1 argue 1 
(js- I ^  JjU)
named sources:
identical semes: 
Prophet: 'he doesn't
haggle and dispute'
( cSjL- ^  ijj Li-; S)
positive
synonym for brotherhood;
'your brother'
( ^ ! )
'my companion'
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*Uthman: 'don't dispute 'friend*
and haggle
Ibn Abi Layla: 'I my brother*
don't dispute *
Ibn ‘Uraar: ‘dispute
(‘v n
This paragraph is interesting in its different approaches 
according to source. The first, anonymous, sources do not 
actually use the keyword, but synonyms of it. Also, except 
for the last anonymous one, none of these cite any 'positive* 
element. It is in the quotes by named sources that some 
form of keyword is consistently used, and it is here that 
there is the accumulation of 'positive* elements which con­
stitutes an image of brotherhood or community.
In this paragraph, all quotes are lines of 'poetry*, and 
present comments by the unknown on the unknown. Absence 
of particular person, place and time puts emphasis on events, 
and this is appropriate to animals as well as to men. In 
this case, event is unacceptable behaviour. It is to be 
noted that the overall keyword 'dispute' appears only once,
§6:
argument in terms of: behaviour of men/animals 
keyword: 'disagree' )
sources: anonymous
negative 
variations of 
'disagree'
( uiJLi-! GlJJU-
but 'associate'
positive
U)
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and it is its synonym, 'disagree1 which appears here in 
various forms. Also, there are, essentially, no 'positive' 
elements here. In these two features, the anonymous quotes 
here resemble the anonymous quotes in the previous paragraph. 
§7:
argument in terms of man's relation to virtue 
keyword: 'dispute' (*!/• )
sources
negative
Zuhair 'sectarians' e 
al-Babi ( Vi ■ _ )
*Umar
ibn
'Abdul
Aziz
*Umar
ibn
Hubaira
controversies'
( I)
dispute' (
'persistence' (
one of 'dispute' ( *[>*) 
the
famous
'its bad influence'
(  ^4'“’ )
(evil effects on):
positive
'his obligation/religion*
( )
'oh God, I take refuge in you'
( ^  i d Jjxt ^JJI)
' its good' ( ajy>- )
'oh God, I take refuge in you'
( 4  4*1 reJJt)
' its good' ( ajJ-)
(transformations of)
'manliness' ( 5c^JI)
Uf
'affection' (
'friendship' ( jlj-^ Jl) 
'concise' ( jrTy*)
'mild' (
'wary' ( )
'truthful' (jj^Ju*)
For brevity, I have not listed all the elements on the 
'negative' side, it being assumed that 'dispute' is the main 
factor. The interest here lies, rather, in the list of
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'positive' elements. First of all, there is the intro- 
duction of 'religion' and 'refuge in God'. Secondly, there 
is a list of virtues, most of which are associated with the 
Arab tradition of behaviour and language, and which, again, 
stress communal virtues.
§8 :
argument in terms of man's relation to God 
keyword: 'dispute'
sources:
Quran
Jahiz
Luqman
Other
Ash- 
Sha 4bi
negative
anger ' !)
dispute1 { )
dispute' (*!/•)
positive
° * iprostrate self' (
Hassan 'disputing' ( )  
'exchange of 
views
a
fighter
'wisdom' ( )
'truth' (^ )
‘wisdom1 ( )
'friendship' ( )
Ishaq 'disagreement' 
al-
Mawsili
In this paragraph, the previous mention of religion is con­
tinued in commentary by Jahiz and by citation of a Quranic 
1
quote. Then there is testimony by Luqman, a mythical Arab 
figure, demonstrably handing down wisdom: from father to
son. The following authorities are Islamic traditionists 
and jurists, and a court musician, in other words, those 
who hand down for the purposes of religion and law, or of 
art. The new element in the argument is 'wisdom', this is
Quran 96:19: '. . . Prostrate and approach*
For context of quote, see below: 3.4.
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explicit in the word, used three times, though only twice 
as a clear positive option. Then, it is implicit in the 
worldly tone of compromise which usually pervades 'wisdom 
literature' and appears here in the attitude of the jurist 
who does not dispute the reception of his opinion, the 
Qurashi who avoids possible controversy, and the musician 
who argues for moderation.
3.3 Knowledge
3.3.1 Authority
For this second section of quotes, I will not identify 
each source. The category is that of Greeks, in their 
global capacity as wise ancients. Though Jahiz does attrib­
ute almost each quote to a named individual, his attributions 
and phraseology sometimes differ from analogous material in 
the Muntakhab Siwan al-Hikmah of Abu Sulaiman as-Sijistani. 
However, the question here is not that of accuracy, but 
rather, of utility: what purpose is served by the Greeks
as authenticating category? I regard this material, again, 
as above all exemplary, and feel the question cannot be 
answered until the material itself is analysed. I will 
proceed, as hitherto, to present argument in terms of 
accumulation of semic elements.
Compare, for instance, in paragraph 191, the last part 
of the quote by 'Tumuqrat' with the version in Sijistani,
D.M. Dunlop (ed.) (The Hague, 1979), p. 72, lines 1489-90.
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3.3.2 Argument
§190:
argument in terms of knowledge and virtue 
keyword: 'knowledge' (
negative 
'ignorant' ( I know' (
bodies of knowledge'( )
knowledge1 { )
learned man'
positive
' virtue' (IJL^ )
'stubborn' ( jltU-. ) 'just' (duzj* )
This paragraph begins the second section with a bland aphorism
had begun with anonymous worldly wisdom. However, the sub­
sequent quotes here use versions of the keyword 'knowledge'
only serve to emphasize it. Unlike the keyword of the first 
section, this one has value as a 'positive' element, but 
this is just a change of focus. Moreover, there is liaison 
between the two sections in that the 'stubborn* which appears 
here can be related to 'dispute' and its synonyms from the 
first section.
A
on 'life', just as the initial in the first section
{ ) over and over, even in contradictory statements which
§191 :
argument in terms of search for knowledge
keyword: knowledge
negative positive
action' 
truth* (
good' ( 1 )
beauty' )
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' abstinence 1 {I J-ftj )
' lack ' (
1 excess 1 ( 3 j Lj)
'stubbornness' (3ujL*J1)
'caused' ( 'causing' (<—J U-)
'dominated* 'dominating* ( ■—JU)
'searching' ( j£\j  )
'guiding' (
‘preferable to me' (J'll. -».f )
The scope widens in this paragraph, as good and evil, truth and 
the beautiful, fill out the opposition of knowledge and 
ignorance. The subject is 'search for knowledge' ( I . 111 Ji, ) 
and intent is involved through preference and motivation.
One of the most striking features is emphasis on action; 
not only is the word used over and over, and implicit in 
'search', but the active participle is given positive value 
as against the passive 
§192:
argument in terms of types of knowledge 
keyword: knowledge
negative positive
'its ignorance1 ( <lL ^ )  'spiritual knowledge'
’its opposition' ( ai}U) ( ^ ^ 1 ^ 1 )
'cognition of the beneficial'
( 1 )
'cognition of the One'
-  —
I disagree with the translations here of M. Adad, 
'Trad^cj^ion, le kitab al-Tarbi' wa-l-tadwir d ' al-Gahi?
{Leiden^-1 961?) : ( as Science and (J*®) as Art. it is
inappropriate for this context, a 'Nachdichtung' of later 
occidental antitheses.
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In this paragraph, intent is again presented, here in terms
of 'longing* l^J=>) . Furthermore, knowledge is posited
as necessary. The new element is varieties and hierarchies
of 'knowledge', and there is introduction of the synonym:
'cognition' . It seems clear that in this context,
the lexeme is spiritual 'knowledge* not 'science*. For
this reason, I prefer to translate ( as a 'percipient*
man, rather than accept Adad's 'un homme raisonable'. I
think Mohammed Arkoun's reading of the verb (J**) is apropos
here: 'reconnaitre . . . 1'esprit rdflechit - au sens
propre - des verites deja donn^es . . . 1'intelligence est
2
tourn^evers ce qui est d£ja dnonc£ ou vdcu.' What is 
involved is man's reflection on a religious 'knowledge' which 
has been revealed.
§193:
argument in terms of survival of knowledge 
keyword: knowledge
‘dominated* { <—
' overwhelmed' (j )
‘revolt*
Here, the idea of motivation is further compounded by the
introduction of 'nature* and 'appetite'. Again, it is to 
_
Adad, op. cit., p. 314.
2
M. Arkoun, Essais sur la Pensde Islamique (Paris, 1977), 
p. 192, note 2.
negative 
'nature' ( 
'appetite' (5^ -lJl )
positive
value' (
‘deficiency* ( 1)
'derangement' (JW-^) 
'domination' ( VUJ1)
'nobility* ( i ) 
'economy' ( jLaiSl)
' consequence' (iJ L*J 1 ) 
'understanding' ( ^ J  )
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be noted that the passive participle has a negative role.
The word 'cognition* is given more prominence than 'knowledge', 
and 'understanding* { ^J) is used as a synonym. Search for 
knowledge has broadened out here to problems of its mainten­
ance within man (despite 'appetite') and within the world 
(despite 'domination').
§194:
argument in terms of recompense of search 
keyword: 'knowledge'
negative positive
'longing' ( ) 'utilization' ( ^ U^jl)
'fear' ( ) 'in deference to knowledge 1
'competitiveness' ( l«ib*) ( ^ JL*Jt
'for the sake of clarity'
( dJ LjU* N 1 (J-toaJ) 
'merit' (jli^uJ)
This paragraph is one long quote, expanding the idea of intent; 
and taking this to the logical conclusion of proper utiliz­
ation of knowledge according to proper motivation in its 
search. Thus, as in the previous paragraph, search is related 
to manifestation in the world of the 'knowledge* in question.
3.4 From Community to Knowledge
The semic field in the first section of paragraphs is 
expanded to one in which 'dispute' is presented as threat 
both to man's relation to man, and to man's relation to God. 
Accompanying this is positive emphasis on traditional Arab 
virtues, a sense of communal interdependence, and compromise 
through wisdom.
In the last section of paragraphs, the concensus of
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quotes by the (wise) Greeks turns the seemingly neutral word 
’knowledge* into spiritual knowledge which requires active 
search and pure intent.
What is presented in these two sections of quotation 
is essentially images which will be associated with the 
1 forbearance * (r1-) of Arab society, and the 'knowledge*
( of Islam, through 'wisdom* and appropriate authorities, 
one leading to the other.
The Quranic quote (96:19) in paragraph 8 in some sense 
serves as a link in this chain. As noted, most quotes are 
elicited through a common keyword, but in this case that 
is not so. What does seem of relevance is that in the same 
surah there are two preceding verses thematically connected 
to these paragraphs:
v.2-5: '. . . God has taught men by the pen what he
did not know*
( |J-*- U&L-j'iM jJLp pJLaJ L ^  JJl . . . )
v.6: 'Surely, man exceeds the proper bounds1 (Blach^re
2
and Kasimirski: 'is rebellious')
( J i J  0 L ^ I  0 j # )
It thus seems clear that Jahiz is adducing this reference 
to leave off discord, and turn to the knowledge God has 
revealed. It seems just as clear that the two sets of 
quotations Jahiz uses serve to substantiate and authenticate 
this.
R. Blachere, Le Coran (Paris, 1957), p. 658. 
Kasimirski, Le Coran (Paris, 1970), ad loc.
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3.5 Discourse Register
3.5.1 Wisdom
Having hypothesized this relationship between the two 
sections of quotes, based on development of argument by 
expansions in the semic field, I will now, briefly, consider 
features of syntax in connection with identification of the 
discourse register.
As pointed out, each section begins with aphoristic 
quotes of the traditional 'wisdom' type. In paragraph 5: 
prescriptions for behaviour in the world:
'show enmity to him who insults you'
( d U N  o. A )
3Tn paragraph 190: description of the situation in the world:
'life is short, art is long . . . '
( . ♦ . Ic-Licd I)
These are close to the types of Arab proverb set out in the
i
collection made by J.L. Burckhardt and meet several of the 
criteria for proverb or maxim in Jolles' chapter 'Locutions’; 
'distinction des termes dans les classements', 'juxtaposition 
dans les correlations'. Jolles adds that 'la pens£e concep- 
tuelle est prdeis^ment 1'obstacle devant lequel cet univers 
se dresse'.^
(a) the conceptual
However, the following quotes in each section, and 
especially their cumulative effect, present greater complexity. 
The conceptual is not avoided. This is even visible syntac­
tically, in each paragraph. For instance, paragraph 7, which
begins with a short, terse question-answer of a catechistic 
-
J.L. Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs (London, 1980).
2
Jolles, op. cit., p. 125.
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type:
'where did dispute sprout up? - among the sectarians'
( julp _
expands into quotes feeding off their own phraseology/ adding 
new elements and increasing in complexity:
1 so it . . . (effects) . . . until it . . .
(transformations) . . .'
( * ♦ » ^ )
In the last section, throughout the paragraphs there
are instances of complex phrasing, with the complications of: 
§191: ‘might be' ( ^  )
§192: *if it were not for' ( V etc.
Also, contradiction does not just figure in the oppos­
itions of words, like typical proverbs, but in conceptual 
subordinations such as in paragraph 5:
'will not attain the right . . . even if he is in
r wthe right' ( jj-** . . . iiJb- . . . V)
and in the last section, there is contradiction in word, 
phrase, and in statement (especiallys§190, 193).
(b) the experienced
The contradiction of statement in the last section lends 
a lively feeling to the quotes, as if they were part of an 
ongoing dialogue. The counterpart to this in the first 
section is reliance on report as immediate statement, seen 
in the predominance, from the second part of paragraph 6
trs
on, of 'he said' (JU> ) rather than 'the saying o f  (Jy ) . 
Jolles emphasizes this aspect of the 'locution' and calls 
it 'la disposition mentale de 1'experience', and goes on 
to say 'on isole un fait . . . et on l'enfile sur le collier 
de 1'experience'.
Ibid., p . 126.
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(c) the moral
Jolles proceeds to say, 'l'univers de l'empirisme ignore
i
la morale’. However, syntactically and semantically, the
paragraphs do not fit this description. First, syntactically,
the quotes in their cumulative effect contain more conceptual
subordinations than simple juxtapositions; they imply moral
resolution. Secondly, in terms of their semantic features,
this resolution is demanded. In the first section, the
personal experiences are not without cautionary intent (§5,|8),
and there are admonitions for the future by citation of
positive values (§7) or of negative behaviour (§6). Moral
^ r<s-
prescription ^ S^explicit in the second section in such 
formulae as 'better than' in paragraph 190, 'more
** W £
dear to me' (Jlu-^-t) in paragraph 191, etc. This, then, 
is a conceptual and moral universe in which right behaviour 
(avoid discord, seek the knowledge God has revealed) is 
indicated.
3.5.2 Documentary
(a) exempla - the event
Writing about exempla, Stierle quotes material which
is relevant here. First, on event as moral catalyst, he
quotes Neushafer, 'car seul le particulier et 1'unique peuvent
soulever des probl&mes et non le gdndral ou ce qui ne change 
2
pas’. Secondly, on personal implication by event, there 
is this comment from Montaigne, '1'instant dramatique . . .
implique la cat^gorie de la responsabilitd'.3 Thirdly, this
 ^ Ibid., p. 127.
2 Quoted in K. Stierle, ‘l'Histoire comme Exemple, l ’Exemple 
comme Histoire', Po^tigue, 10 (Paris, 1972),p189.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
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responsibility operates at all levels in the paragraphs: 
man to himself (last section), to his fellow man, and to 
God (first section) and is articulated in ideas conceived 
as oppositions. Hence the relevance of H. Friedrich,
1l'exemple d^signe toutefois moins des types moraux que 
bien des relations morales. Ce sont les rapports du bien
•i
et du mal, de 1'intelligence et de la naivete.' In the 
first section, the first of these oppositions could be seen 
in the following:
‘dispute1 ( ‘l^ JI) vs. 'brotherhood \ etc.
and the second, in the second section:
'ignorant' ( J-ftU-) vs. ’learned' ( J^U)
(b) memorabilia - the norm - the authority
Jolles does have a 'simple form' which embodies both 
the world of experience and that of moral choice. He calls 
it 'memorables' and its features are the single event, 
oppositions, dispersion of statement but cumulative signif­
icance, a 'forme dans laquelle tous les ddtails r£els sont
rapport£s les uns aux autres et h. un ordre sup£rieur dans
2
une relation significative'. This type of exempla is what 
J. Wansbrough calls 'documentary', 'the production of 
materials to supply paradigms, prescriptions, in brief, 
normative patterns of conduct for the community whose genesis
As noted in the beginning, this normative material is 
presented as part of the problematic of A.W. : he is being
lectured to, and there is a coincidence here to the issues 
raised in the traditional 'wisdom' literature of Israel.
 ^ Ibid., p. 182.
2
Jolles, op. cit., p. 169.
3
J. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu (Oxford, 1978), p. 139.
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The initial fault, of disputatiousness, is related to the
1 2 stubbornness and quarrelling which were topics in this
literature. Also, the concluding charge, of ignorance, can
be understood, as it was by these counsellors, as ignorance
3
of lGod-given laws’, those which should constitute society’s 
norm.
Of final interest in this discourse register is the 
role of legitimizing authority. I have pointed out that 
it is only in the quotes of the anonymous in the first 
section that no positive moral values are adduced. Conse­
quently, it is the two main groups, named (Islamic) community 
figures, and Greeks, who provide moral admonition, and they 
can be regarded as two parts of the Islamic heritage. Through 
quotation, Jahiz corroborates this wisdom by (1L  exempla 
which exist in time and place, the lived experience of event 
(section 1) and (2) also by exempla: beyond time, place
and event, witness by personal reflection, for universal 
validity (section 2). As Mohammad Arkoun writes, 'les 
aphorismes . . . expriment les valeurs morales consacrdes 
par les experiences des nations et rehaussdes par l'autoritd
4
des sages, des mystiques, des grands princes.'
However, it is true that much of the material in the 
first section exists in terms of partial reference within 
the text (allusion to unspecified persons in paragraph 5, 
allusions to unspecified issues in paragraph 7) and
P.A.H. de Boer, 'The Counsellor', Wisdom in Israel 
(Leiden, 19b0), p. 50.,
2
B, Gemser, 'The Rib', op. cit., p. 120.
 ^ Ibid., p. 136.
4
M. Arkoun, op. cit., p. 209.
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i
non-corroboration outside the text. In other words, the 
authorities for the wisdom cited legitimize that wisdom, 
but that wisdom also legitimized those events, those 
authorities. Thus, the problem of reference here, similar 
to that in the Riddle, is not merely one of accumulation 
of material for authority, but also identification of that 
authority: collective memory in the Riddle, personal
witness in Memorabilia.
As mentioned above (3. 2 .1 )| quotes by the named 
authorities here are only found in Jahiz.
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Chapter Four
THE CASE - II: THE SUPRA-SENSORY
In the Riddle and Memorabilia, I have analysed Jahiz's 
use of question and quotation as epistemological tools. I 
would now like to look at his reflections on the world as 
1rationaliste' exposition. In the first treatment of the 
Case, I dealt, briefly, with Jahiz's approach to the order 
of the world: the congruity between the order of nature
and the order of God. In this second treatment, I would
2like to examine his approach to systems, the supra-sensory
world of mathematics, music, memory and language. This will
be a question of external witness: what is known and how,
leading to that of internal witness: how it is stated.
In the supra-sensory, one might expect some 'logical
is rcprejcloI
relationships' and, thus, knowledge as Plato^conceived of
3
it. However, it is difficult at first to see what epistem­
ological bases Jahiz might be presenting, for two reasons.
One, the enquiry in this section of paragraphs 141 to 155 
is usually by questions, a few scattered alternatives, and 
little apparent thematic development. Two, the questions 
about 'origins' of things are often of the 'who . . . when
. . . where' type seen in the Riddle, and involve reference
to things unknown to us now, or arkane even then. Furthermore, 
_
Pellat, op. cit., p. X.
2
I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (London, 
1976), p. 29.
 ^ R. Shattuck, Proust (Glasgow, 1979), p. 143.
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the overall context is mock consultation of A.W., in contro­
versy over these subjects. These are the recurrent obstacles 
in the risala: subversion by an apparently superficial
approach, and distraction by attack on A.W.
Notwithstanding this initial resemblance to the discourse 
register of the Riddle, striking in this section is the con­
sistent interweaving of 'who' with 'why', and also the 
interdependence of the systems under discussion. Examples 
of these features are found in paragraph 148: 
the question of ‘w h o 1:
'and who was the first person who counted to ten?'
•V IV c
( ojJl* ^  J a* ^  i ^ )
the question of 'why':
'and made ten the end and extreme limit'
( i )
and §14 9:
interdependence of systems:
'and his saying "man is ten things"'
( c L-if ajJLs- dJ^ 5)
4.1 Origins
4.1.1 Arkane - East
The first point of note about 'origins' is that they 
are often stated in terms of foreign names, constituting 
a body of knowledge removed in time and space. For instance, 
on mathematics and notation, one finds these 'Eastern' ref­
erences in paragraph 147:
time: 'how long ago was the computation of al-Hasmirj
produced?1 (
person: 'who was the originator of the ciphers of Hind?'
( JltfJI
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place: 'and where did a people write the Sind-Hind
and the Arkair^l?'
( hLuft 1 \ ‘  ^1  ^* ‘ 1 - ^   ^* W [j )
4.1.2 Arkane - West
The second point is that 'origin' is often stated in 
terms of precedence, some prior excellence or inventiveness, 
and in paragraph 150 this is in reference to ‘Western1 
sources, the Greeks:
in excellence: 'what was the position of Euclid and
Mirsutus with respect to Pythagoras?'
( W* o* jy*j <yj~ ^
'and their students with respect to his?'
in invention: 'and did you not attribute to Euclid
the making of barbitons and harps?'
(<_ij Jaj \j*S 1 <3L*_Lt£> ^-4^/ jlJU i uS )
4.1.3 Arkane - 1 Hidden'
The third point about enquiry into 'origins’ is that 
the question is often posed by implying a 'hidden' aspect, 
be it blatantly concrete or totally abstract. This is 
expressed in paragraph 141 in terms of words, and I will list 
the questions by hierarchy of abstractness.
thing is hidden - physically - not seen
'and what is the "presence" that was in the ark?'
L|)
meaning is hidden - physically - not heard (and 'foreign') 
'what is the interpretation of "murmuring"?'
( I (J--J l» )
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meanings are hidden - foreign - not understood 
'what is "an-nirnijat" and . . . "taujiya"?'
( 1 L ^  » . . o \ U )
significance is hidden - message is ambiguous - no
relevance
'that wealth which, he who takes of it repents, 
and he who leaves it alone repents' (see §66, 2.1.2) 
significance is hidden - message is missing - no 
reference
'and inform me about the saying of Khalil on ancient 
fantasy’ ( ^ olll J-JUJI Jy &
The question is, basically, what system (if any) deter­
mines meaning and significance? Though Jahiz goes on to 
discuss those systems one might think of as non-dependent 
on'language (mathematics and music), it is consistently by 
means of words as a designating mechanism, the syntagm as 
an identifying tool, and the paradigm as one of extrapolation.
4.2 Systems
4.2.1 Mathematics
The first questions explicitly posed in terms of system
in mathematics are about its decimal base, and in paragraph
148 Jahiz presents this choice of arguments;
analogy: 'then broke down by tens that which was more
than its numbers, because the fingers are ten'
£  £
{ \*o ^ I ^ (_a j I jlpI j I ^ )
“j
observation: 'or did he see that multiplication would
never be by anything but tens?1
(c , - 1 V 1 jl. 1 v o.Hfl"! 1 ^T pt)
For observation as sense perception, see below: 5.2.
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report: ‘or the first saying, "all things are by tens"1
Lf-tf ‘i_tvr jjvi jyui ft)
In paragraph 152, designation of another base number 
is considered, and the problem is stated slightly differently. 
The number is 16, and constitutes the range of all tonal 
possibilities. Is its derivation form:
the mind: 'because he did not know any more than
those?’ ( Lf_u j S t djjo ^ f)
the world: 'or because there is no more in creation
than what he knew?'
( d j j f  L VI 2SLb>J1 ajV ^t)
4.2.2 Music
As stated above, these supersensory systems are shown 
to be interdependent, and in paragraph 152 the internal 
workings of the tonal system are explained by mathematics.
In this case, it is multiplication which determines relation­
ships, leading to particular designations, as follows:
'mathna' = 2 x 'z ir'
'mathlath' = 2 x 2 x 'zir'
'bamm' = 3 x 2 x 'zir'
Another aspect of interdependence of systems appears 
when Jahiz asks about musical-physical-emotional correspond­
ences, in terms of their original designations as such:
§152: 'why did he make X (correspond) to Y ? '
-emotion- -humour-
'j,)
' /
§152: 'and (he make) Z (correspond) to Y ? '
l l
-tone- -humour-
_
On properties as opposed to our experience of them, see 
I.A. Richards, op. cit., p. 29.
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The next questions in this paragraph are on the same 
subject, but clearly posit a system of analogy.
In the beginning, it is implicit:
A is B
-tone- -adjective of element-
'and the "zir" is delicate, fiery, light'
At the end, it is explicit:
Z is like W
-tone- -element-
' and the "bamm" is like the earth'
one*
However, use of analogy from/system to another can com-
K
plicate designation. Just as in paragraph 152 names of 
strings were described from emotional states via ..relationship 
with the humours, so in paragraph 153 tones have a transform­
ing effect on the emotions, with subsequent vocabulary 
problems:
music - designation in language:
'and why did he claim that there are tunes which dis­
turb and dismay?' ( g j L j jJJL L O*
change of music - mathematics visible - change in 
language:
'so if one increases it one destroys, and if one 
strengthens one kills' ( ^  aJ> jlj
change in music - mathematics invisible - change in 
language: metaphor;
'just as deadly poisons are described’
(dJb llJ I 1 L5*)
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(a) music and language
In this way, one reaches a problem which is really a 
problem of system in language, not in music, namely that 
one effect can be described in antithetical terms:
§153: ‘and made a simple tune that kills by melting,
and made a tune that kills by freezing'
( JliL Ll>J !)->« Ll»J
So, from the problem of designation of tones and tunes, one 
slides into the recurrent linguistic problems of: 
polysemy: 1 word: kill
2 meanings: music - poison
synonymy: 2 words: melt - freeze
1 meaning: kill
(b) music and attribution
At the other end of the scale of designation in music, 
there is attribution. It is also an 'origins' question, 
but stated in terms of typologies. It appears in paragraph 
151 in reference to types of songs. The suggestion is that 
a name may come from:
a person: ((jikuajt) or a type (by profession):
a place: a type (by status) : ( ,^Lii)l)
(c) music and anecdote
The problem of attribution, still under the rubric of 
music, appears also in connection with origins or instruments. 
In paragraph 154, on the subject of the *ud, Jahiz quotes 
a 'saying' ( )  which can be presented, schematically, 
this way:
name: correspondence name: in *ud name: in son
from: nature 
culture
chest
pitcher
thigh
leg
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name: correspondence name: in cud name: in son
from: culture - no story - bridge - story- foot
culture pegs fingers
culture strings sinews, veins
In other words, the forms in the instrument are attributed 
on the basis of resemblance, but names are not. If there 
were stories about their etymology, they do not appear here; 
'lost* with usage, they fall into the category of catachresis.
4.2.3 Words
(a) designation
This problem of derivation of words appears as an issue 
on its own, and though it is, again, phrased in terms of 
‘origins', Jahiz presents it in the very concrete forms of 
spelling and articulation. The first instance is in para­
graph 144:
'and why did balgham (phlegm) with a "b" become more 
appropriate than with a "t"?‘
( * h J L  * U L  ^ A J J I  j U  'J,)
'and why was atribile with a "g" more appropriate 
than with an "h"?'
t
(“U-JL Lfj. ^ J L  *1 — )l 2^ J1 ojtf ,^)
Pellat provides a chart in the glossary showing traditional 
correspondences (briefly mentioned above in relation to 
music) but it cannot be pure coincidence that these pairs 
of letters, in their Arabic spelling, are homologous, were 
it not for the diacritical points. The question remains 
posed as a choice between correspondence or designation, 
arbitrary or otherwise.
Pellat, op. cit., p. 112.
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The second question about origins of words (and their 
letters) appears in paragraph 147, as Jahiz begins to consider 
mathematics and, hence, mathematical and scientific terms:
'and who called algebra algebra, and a square root
square root and ammonia ammonia?1
( a 1 Huai I  j 1 *i> i 11^  j  L j  jlpJ Ij L 1 )
The wording of the question with 'who' distracts attention 
from its formulation. In the previous question on pairs 
of letters as written, they were almost homologous. Here, 
in this sequence of terms, as spoken, they are not quite 
homologous, but certainly alliterative, as follows:
j  ' t  - * r
j  J ^
j J Li
1 • .
It*is, as will be pointed out, one of the many games Jahiz
plays with the identity of things, language not the least
of- them.
In the same paragraph, 147, still ostensibly concerned 
with mathematics, Jahiz poses the following origin/designation 
question:
'and the akdariya, from what is it derived?1
( I ^
If Pellat's reading is correct and this is a particular 
problem in female succession, the question could be 
schematized thus:
lineage in language - the word 'akdariya'
lineage in life - the phenomenon referred to
lineage in discourse - the reference to this
See below: 5.2.1 and 8.2.
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(b) sequence
When Jahiz discusses sequences of words, his first ref­
erence in this section is the eliptical one on ’ancient 
fantasy' (see above: 4.1). This is followed by questions
about the genesis of poetry in terms of:
the unconscious: ‘on your saying about the poetry
that we recite in sleep'
( pLu.ll ^9 a i,c ujJ l i dl^ -5
the conscious: 'the poetry that we invent from exchange
of speech and weighing of matters'
( .^ 1^3 I dls l_t« ; ‘y& ^  iD I i * <*■! I )
A f
also: the unacknowledge^: 'is not blamed and is not thanked'
(.A: y? v
•(c) memory
This contrast of the unconscious and conscious is 
further elaborated in paragraph 143, in terms of spontaneity 
and effort in memory. This is then reinforced by rephrasing 
in opposite terms, those of forgetting:
'why do we begin to forget a line from a poem, and 
a verse from a whole chapter (Scripture), or a word 
from all of a sermon?'
L  ^I iii,11 | j ojb . *1 )
( 1
The problem of memory (j?*iiJI ) is then extended to that 
of memorization ( in paragraph 144. Following the
discussion of appropriateness of letters (see above:
4.2.3(a)) and the possibilitiy of someone's inability to 
memorize:
'the heart resisting memorization'
(J s to J I ^  £j\J\ U -liJ l)
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the question of reasons, and thus of system, is posed in 
these terms:
'and is there any alternative to truth from specific 
causes and particular reasons, and if not, then it 
would be conceivable that this poem should be forgotten 
instead of that one'
! ^
( C JJL.r J  JU d 1 d ^
In other words, if memory cannot be commanded by effort, 
and the derivations of spellings and words are nebulous, 
how is it that we remember them, and that what we remember 
is, somehow, appropriate?
To this point, most of the examples of sequences of 
words have been in connection with poetry, but Jahiz also 
disaggregates sequence, to specify:
§144: 'some of them are better at memorizing meanings
and some are better at memorizing expressions'
( Jb UJ L*^ JJ )
and: 'and why did some people become better at memorizing
genealogies and some of them better at memorizing chains 
of authority?'
( -jaib-1 ^  LJI j Ltd? )
This last question concerns lineage of people and lineage 
of stories. If one adds this to the problem of derivation 
already mentioned, one gets the following table:
noun lineage story
'akdariya' common x
succession x x
genealogy proper x
authority x x
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The important and constant element here is lineage, the 
transmission of the known, of syntagmatic associations.
4.3 Syntagms
Jahiz's approach to the supra-sensory has been fairly 
consistent, beginning with questions about 'origins', 
followed by questions about how systems operate. However, 
the arbitrary has often predominated over the systematic 
(see Chart I), and this is because of the mechanics of 
language. His questions on language coincide with reflections 
on memory, a subject on which, precisely, there are two major 
theories, that of the systematic, and that of the arbitrary.
Briefly summarized, Plato's theory is that knowledge is based
1 2 on a 'reminiscence' of 'logical relationships'.. For
Bergson, memory is of two types: one, memory of habit, two:
spontaneous memory which 'disturbs the equilibrium of
established habit and brings back the complete image of a
3
past moment, still stamped with a date and place'.
Since it has been noted that in this section there have 
been few 'logical relationships', rather a predominance of 
seemingly arbitrary designations and associations, it is 
more appropriate to analyse Jahiz's material by consideration 
of the syntagmatic axis, common both to Bergson's 'memory 
of habit' and to his 'spontaneous memory'. The associations 
of the syntagmatic are realized here in lists, associations, 
and anecdotes.
Platon, Mdnon (Paris, 1967), p. 371.
2
Shattuck, op. cit., p. 143.
 ^ Ibid.
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4.3.1 Lists
The lists can be broken down into various types (see 
Chart III) . First, there are those which are cumulative 
and consist of many words in the same category. Then, there 
are lists which are used to determine rank within a category. 
Next, there are lists with constitute a picture, by combining 
categories, and last, there are those which contrast cate­
gories. I will give one or two examples of each.
(a) cumulative
An example of the cumulative list is found in paragraph 
141, in which the elements are of the arkane type. Not only 
is their significance 'hidden', but often they, themselves, 
are hidden (the object in the ark). This attribute, the 
arkane, is to be found in practically all the cumulative 
lists. They construct syntagmatic associations whereby one 
element, if remembered, will evoke another; it is here the 
synonymic slide of the arkane.
(b) rank
The second type of list is that of ranking, the question 
of origins leading to that of originator in time, or exemplum 
in quality. The latter is the type found in paragraph 151, 
on well-known musicians. This ranking is like the cumulative 
lists in that by their association, it is assumed that these 
people are all in the same category; on the other hand, 
ranking may lead to dissociation, the competition which 
evokes a story (of which more below, 4.3.3).
(c) picture
The third type of list mixes categories in associations 
which constitute a composite picture of persons, time and 
place. Paragraph 155 is a good example of this. The
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categories of book (book K and book T ) , persons (Mutakallim 
vs. Manichean), places (Siraf, Byzantium), time (descent 
of Jupiter), are all mixed in such a way that Mutakallim 
stands out against a background of 'the other’, again the 
arkane.
(d) differential
This defining of ‘the other' by lists is underlined 
by contrast with instances in which association is stopped 
in some way, and the elements are made to stand out on their 
own. An example is in paragraph 143 in which the elements 
can be regarded a s :
' poem1 (ajh^tS)
'chapter' (of scripture) ( )
'sermon' (Llai-) 
in'other words: literature, which might be forgotten:
poetry 
poetry/prose 
prose 
which represent:
Arabic language 
Arab/Islamic link 
Islamic exhortation 
On the one hand, these seem to be choices; on the other, 
they constitute an associative picture by specifying the 
range of possibilities, or range of experience.
4.3.2 Anecdote
Besides these variations on association by lists, 
there is association by anecdote and story. Anecdote 
arises where there is action as well as people involved 
and a good example of this is in paragraph 145. It is a
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fairly striking example because of the challenging formulation 
by negative question, and the negative behaviour referred to: 
'why did you not beat the Samaritan and not bite and 
hurt Mani?'
m > m j
It will be noticed that such anecdotes and some instances
of 'the saying' ( J>*JI) beg to be completed, to be put in
\
context, for a story to be told.
4.3.3 Story
Story, in the examples here, is self-contained and 
supplies all its own answers, usually giving some allusion 
to reasons for action or even alternatives. In paragraph 
154, for example, a 'saying' introduced a story in the sense 
that it not only attributes the making the invention of the
‘ud to Lamak, but establishes a reason for its form, the
resemblance with his son.
'Lamak made the *ud in the image of the thigh of his
son' (*-“1 l£j 1^)
In paragraph 150, a ranking list is followed by a story about 
a killing, with a certain amount of complexity by two potential 
breaks in the action. One is the condition of superiority 
which should have inhibited this:
'and why did he kill him as he was above him in . . .'
( . . . asjs ills
The other is change of mind:
'and why did Sabur (Pellat: Chosroes) desist from
his killing after his decision to kill him?'
See above: 3.5.2.
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Basically, in this section, Jahiz has been dealing with
epistemology as applied to supra-sensory systems. It is
not an easy subject, as shown in St. Augustine's description:
The memory also contains the innumerable principles 
and laws of numbers and dimensions. None of these can 
have been conveyed to it by means of the bodily 
senses, because they cannot be seen, heard, smelled, 
tasted or touched. I have heard the sounds of words 
by which their meaning is expressed when they are 
discussed, but the words are one thing and the prin­
ciples another . . .1
4.4 Syntagm and Paradigm
Essentially, Jahiz has been dealing with the same 
problems: memory, knowledge, and the gap between words and
principles. Discourse necessarily fills this gap, however, 
and it is clear that Jahiz1s exposition shows the use of 
its two associative principles: syntagmatic and paradigmatic.
These are even stated as alternatives. Thus, in paragraph 
148, on the origin of the decimal system, there is the choice 
between the syntagmatic; the 'saying1 that . . .  or the 
paradigmatic: the analogy between numbers and fingers.
4.4.1 Report
To make this clearer, I will give further examples of 
both choices, though analogy (the paradigmatic) will be dealt 
with more thoroughly below, in Case III - The Sensory. On 
the whole, in this section, the syntagm predominates, dis­
played, on one level, in the various lists. That the 
elements are often introduced by question should not deceive; 
there is an answer, which is the constitution of the list 
itself. Then there is a second constitution of the 'known*, 
through a question and answer mechanism which uses the
St. Augustine, Confessions (Harmondsworth, 1982), p. 219.
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eliciting word 'the saying* (J^SJt). In this section, there 
are three different ways in which it operates as an identi­
fying tool: statement of the known, recounting of the known,
and reference to the known.
In paragraph 149, systems are under discussion and 
'saying' is used here to state the first principle, thus: 
'Fazari's saying, "the mind is spherical"'
o ! J>»)
In paragraph 154, 'saying' is used in connection with
Lamak and the ‘u d . It does not state a principle, rather
it sets in motion a story:
'What do you say about their saying "Lamak made the
<^3. . . . "  1 ( . . . 1 l£j <y Lj)
Thirdly, it appears as eliciting reference at the end
of'cumulative lists,/bothlin;paragraphs 141 and 146, phrased
in terms of a question deliberately begging the (known)
1answer:
§141: 'tell me about Khalil's saying on ancient
fantasy' ( ^ uUt ^ 1  J  J*U-J! ^
§146: 'and about their saying "so and so prayed in
^ Cec\t«.s I"
the^name of God tjrte Almighty"'
( dll' U j ^
4.4.2 Resemblance
The analogies Jahiz uses in this section range from
the concrete to the abstract, and most are in some way based
on human experience. First of all, there are situations
of analogy understood as such in the sense that correspondence 
_
That this system works well is evident in Pellat1s sug­
gestion that one look in Jahiz's K: al-Hayawan for the 
'answers' to many of his questions, op. cit., p. XVI.
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is implied, a correspondence by resemblance to the human.
Here, they all depend on the (transforming) verb ‘to make1
§154: ’and that he made the ch£st the thigh1
( I j  JUaJ I )
§148: 'and made the limits of numbers ten tens'
C
( GL*-' l b3 l l (JLr b L& )
§152: ‘and made the zir^the bile1
Then there are explicit analogies of which there is 
an example in paragraph 153, which shows the usual relation­
ship of concrete to abstract called literal to figurative.
‘and why did he describe tunes by freezing and 
melting just as lethal poisons are described?’
( l b l a J  \ I \ £ < L  t j  I ^
There are, of course, other analogies here, but in the 
realm of human experience one of the more abstract is 
extrapolation on the basis of similarity of problem. It 
is exhibited in paragraph 144, and via memorization, links 
one learned skill with another:
’. . . better at retaining expressions, and why do
we not begin to forget swimming though we learned it 
by acquisition’
( La i—- Lj oj>~ L.J ! L'j+d LsJiajLp-f. . . )
' /
The most abstract type of analogy here is that which 
transfers individual experience onto the level of the general, 
such as in paragraph 144:
'and the usual way of things is that the acquired is 
forgotten and ignored and . . .’
( * * « j L* 1  j i d J L*J )
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If general commentary on life is assumed to be based on 
particular experience, particular experience assumes a person, 
time,place and event. Moreover, if Plato is correct that 
knowledge is based on a reconciliation between 'past and 
present experience' one must first know what the elements 
in that past experience are, in order to recognize resem­
blances and make the analogy with the new, present, context.
In other words, one must have the syntagmatic associations 
first, in order to proceed to the paradigmatic ones.
4.4.3 Precedence
There is another reason why the syntagmatic must precede 
the paradigmatic,and that is that it has a determinate order, 
in contrast to the indeterminate order of the paradigm.
Jahiz has illustrated this in several ways already, mentioned; 
they are:
§148: human from ten
§149: ten from human
§152: tones from emotions
§153: emotions from tunes
Thus, if one is looking for 'origins' using analogy, one 
can go in either direction.
On the other hand, using the process of association 
by naming, listing, fixing by report, in time, place, and 
making more vivid by event and the problematical, one con­
stitutes experience (if only vicarious) by which one recalls 
the 'forgotten' elements and can then make the analogy 
between past and present.
Shattuck, op. cit., p. 143.
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4.4.4 Use
At the beginning of the syntagmatic, however, is that 
first mechanism: designation. For this reason, Jahiz does
not merely ask the names of the ’original . . .' but also
about the relationship of signifier to signified: words
and their spelling (§144), their designation (§147), 
derivation (§147), application (§153), and retention in the 
memory (§143). In all these cases, the answer is, by con­
tiguity, found in the contexts in which he situates them, 
himself. For instance, by asking about the interpretation 
of 'murmuration‘ in a paragraph full of arkane terms, it 
cannot but be thought of as also something arkane. Again, 
by asking about correspondences in musical terms, he presents 
a small exposd of these correspondences, namely himself.
In - terms of ’Case’; argument about the world, the'first 
of these is internal witness by linguistic manipulation, 
the second, external witness by conceptual subordination.
Thus, his questions should not be taken at face value 
only and he might agree with 'some . . . critics'
( ) he cites in another work of his,
al-Bayan wa-t-Tabyin:
'and these concepts only come alive through their 
mentioning them, their stories about them, and
A w
their use of them' L*J J ^  elb L>J
( 1f t Lj—Lp ft^ 1-^
These may be regarded as lists, stories, and analogies. So, 
in the context of speculation on supra-sensory systems,
Jahiz's speculation on the epistemological role of attribution 
and predication implicitly concludes that it is the series
Jahiz, al-Bayan wa-t-Tabyin (Beirut, n.d.), p. 54.
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of attributions, the syntagm, which is actually the first 
step in predication.
TH
E 
S
U
P
R
A
-
S
E
N
S
O
R
Y
76
aH
H
US
>H
w
c/3
<
d
o
•H
p
0
SH
0
a,
o
d■H
tr>
•H
O
O
EH
H
<
US
fio
■H
P
0
n
a)
a
o
04 04
P P
x: X!
0 0
d d
0 0
p p
p p
0 0
P i—1
0 0
U 0
« •
o
• •
a
p
p p
0 0
p g g
o 0 0
0 x; xlp p p
p 0 0
0 g g
■ 0 0
0 0
d d* 0 0
Td nd
a) d d0 0 o
u 04 04
P 0 0
o 0 0
o u U
US u M
P 0 O
Td u O
H «• • •
0 d d•H 0 0
O g g
0 d d0 XI XJ ■
d d I
o 0 Td
•H •H d
P P 0
(d d 04
o 0 0
0 p 0
> 0 u
a) ** 0 M
d 0
w oTd u
d P  0
o p  d «*
0) 0 -H 0
d n td tn
•• id ■H i—! 0
tn p u 04 d
d d 0 X tn 0
•H o g 0 d o
x! 04 0 d 0 d
P  w g p p  0
i
Td d
d o d
0 P  0
04 p  p •
0 id p d d
0 d OS 0 0 •
u tn > p p
u •H P p p «
0 to 0 0 0
o 0 0 > > tn
Td Td •H P d
Td \ / 0 u •* P
0 V 0 0 P >i
d Td nd Td d 0•• P 0 • « 0 0
to id d iH p c E
M iH *• -H 0 5 ** ? •• d 0
0  04 0 0 g 0 0 o 0 0 P
P  X 0 g P p  d 0 d 0 p  0
P  0 O 0 04 o ,x d ,x d 0 X
0 d d 0 X 0 d o d d d p
p  d 0 p  0 *0 d p  d p p  -
m r- 00 CM m p
■^r p* in in inr— i— T— ■<— T—
d
*H
tT>
•H
U
O
d
O
•H
P
id
u
0
d
0
tn
0 
3 
O 
P  .. O
>1 m  
u d 
p o 
a> o 
o d
Ot d
(N
■^r
CH
AR
T 
II
77
l—
H
H
CN in
in
C O
in
oo
inin in
78
s
H 0
H <H ■Eh
a
Ej X&
rti
cn
a M
u a
Eh
s
t
o
r
y
m
u
s
i
c
:
 
r
u
l
e
r
so
n:
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
0
-P *
G o
0 0 •
•p CP
(D •p •
■P u u
O td ■H CP CP
Ti G  G G
o •4 0 -P *p
CD £ P  >i tp
G • 2  0 0
0 < O  0 0
H
0
*P 0
-P P
G 0
a> -p 0
P 0 CP
(D P td
m 0 0
m •P G
•H ■H •H
fCJ i— 1 r-H
0
<—H 0 «*
cu G 0
0 0 B0 •P ■P
0* -P
a> <H 0 • •
p +■ 0  J3 0  <
0 0 U *P G tP 0-p •P p 0 G O
o O 0 +J r*4 -P 0•H o 0 -P P G P
a. JO s  <d 0 -P CU
0
G
0
>p MH 0
o 0 -P
■H 0 G
■P G 0 0
0 0 0 P B
6 ’H p 0 0
0 O 0 ■P P
.G -H Cp 0 «P
G •P 0 G 0 0
td 0 G •P P  G
p b b 0 O -P
a>
> 0
■P CP
-P • ■ • • •• Td
td 0 0 0 0
tH G CO G 0 G iH
3 <d 0  t 0 £e ^4 P ^4 P 0p P  O P  O P  Go cd is td % 0 r*4
CN *3* LO lO r- o T~ LO
ten in n in inr— t— c~ *- r— *— T—
79
Chapter Five
THE CASE - III: THE SENSORY
As mentioned in The Case - II, Jahiz is known as a 
1rationaliste', one whose scepticism led him to prefer scien-
i
tific to mythological explanations. I would therefore now 
like to consider his approach to problems of phenomena, the 
world of sense perception, as set out in paragraphs 161 to 
178. This is, again, a problem of external witness: what
is observable in nature, and internal witness: how it is
described.
5.1 Knowledge - Perception
The paragraphs from 161 to 178 may at first appear to 
lack a common theme; three main divisions may be noted: 
one on knowledge ($161-164, 176, 177), one on A.W. and text 
($165, 166), and one on sense perception ($167-175). A 
thematic coherence does emerge, however, the main issues 
being joined in the initial sentence:
§161: 'and I, may I be your ransom, know that I hear,
but I do not recognize the modality of hearing'
I JiL&f I tJl oi cJU j- Utj)
There is, thus, the problem of knowing and recognizing, that 
of the protagonists, Jahiz and A.W., and the problem of the 
senses. Language and text, search and site, are connected
Pellat, op. cit., p. XVI.
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issues but will only be mentioned in passing here, and the 
main focus will be on sense perception as epistemological 
tool.
Let it be noted that the focus on A.W., which invariably 
appears in every discourse register, is specified in paragraph 
166, and can be related to the rest of the section in the 
following ways. First of all, form, conflicting images, 
truth and illusion will be treated here. Secondly, the 
person, physically, as sensor, sensing, and sensed is one 
of the main areas of investigation.
5.2 The World
5.2.1 Resemblance
The senses per se are usually only implied, but in the 
first paragraph, 161, they are mentioned explicitly. In 
this paragraph, also, one finds the problem of resemblance, 
stated through its recurrent confusions, that of site and 
identity.
1. . . o r  whether the seat of recognition is in . . . 
and some might argue for the brain because all the 
senses are in the head'
(_?* cA ^  ^  Ck-*-*
(crljl
Later, paragraph 170 puts in question the confusions of: 
sensor - sensing:
'and the sentient soul is not ifi a^y w^y aware of curuy ^  
its senses'
tv «*
sensor - sensed:
'Thus it is with the sensor and thus it is with the 
sensed' ^  ^LL>-Jl uJJ J^ )
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(a) polysemy
The sense Jahiz deals with preponderantly is the visual, 
but he does include two brief references to the aural, giving 
as examples confusion about the provenance of a sound, or 
about its manifestation.
17 5: provenance:
'and perhaps the noise/voice of thunder is the 
noise/voice of the scolding of an angel'
(elL
173: manifestation:
'the water goblet, how does its noise/voice 
increase without an opening, as the noise/voice 
must have air'
(  ^ i*l 'if o  L a. »i' I ^
In-both of these cases, it is clear that speculation is 
extended by language, here the polysemy of ( ) which
allow anthropomorphic analogy.
It is, however, in the area of visual perception that 
Jahiz considers and reconsiders the problem of knowing by 
the senses. Here, also, he will include instances of the 
extensions possible through polysemy. Thus, in the opening 
paragraph, 161, there is use of the word 'eye/source' ( q s^ -) 
as :
a site of vision:
'and the eye is its door and path'
and in the concluding paragraph, 178, there is use of this 
word a s :
a site of reflection:
'just as the eye of the sun is a disc for the light'
( c L^«aJJ I fjjfZ f \S)
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On the subject of the eye, reference should be made 
to the schematizations of Charts I and II. Chart I presents 
perceptual confusions with the eye as their focus; Chart 
II the eye as medium of analogy.
Besides these instances of extension, or confusion, 
by polysemy, the visual subjects: colours, forms, reflec­
tions, and images are almost interchangeably referred to 
here. Thus I will treat resemblance in terms rather of the 
visual problems presented, variations on the problems of 
identity and site mentioned above. For identity, these will 
be: levels, representation, and reality; for site:
confrontation and collapse. For instance, rarely is identity 
phrased in such a simple way as this question in paragraph 
173:
'and tell me about the colour of the peacock's tail'
(u-i? U=J I ^  or'/V*})
However, considering the complexity of the peacock's tail,
this question is, of course, deceptively simple, and many
of his questions that are worded so simply are about things
that are in some way illusory {§172: mirage, echo, rainbow).
(b) levels
Most of his questions are worded in a more complicated
way, and good examples are two treatments at levels of the
visual, in paragraph 170; in the first he concentrates on 
the representative surface, in the second, on the represented 
image.
'and were it not for our mention of the iron surface, 
or what air is behind it, or what viewing is in front
of it, all that would be one body with its colour'
^  L^ . I j j l»j cI^Jl ^  L^ JLL*- I* I L^ 5*j
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This can be schematized in the following way, representative 
surface:
viewing
f)
image
signifier
surface air
4
image image
colour
signified
In the same paragraph, before his 'explanation1 above:
'and did the colour which represents your colour
cancel the colour in the mirror?'
( aTjJ I q jJ  d jjJ  tJ  ,y  JU I I c l! J J .L ; f )
this may be schematized also, representative image:
your colour image of your colour . colour
of mirror
4 ctLjJ 4, cly! Ji.
image image
4-  ^l^*J I 
image
(c) representation
Jahiz sometimes words such questions solely in terms 
of representation, the image ( i ^ ) without trying to dis­
entangle its levels, as in paragraph 169:
‘and did this seen image cancel the image in its 
place in the mirror?'
l I elb C.lJ-lw. f )
o
However, he cannot resist remolding the reader of the illusory 
qualities in mental representation of visual data, as in 
paragraph 174:
'and we also say that we cannot see an elongated 
variegated village from afar except as round*
( dj., "V I I l ! q  L-iJ ! ZLL tv. «..«J \ I V L5* ^  I bcul J )
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This illusion can lead to far-fetched analogies, such as:
'so perhaps the sun is cruciform and the stars square'
( d. Kjj* I *J_9 )
(d) reality
Twice Jahiz poses the question of the reality of mental 
representations, one with reference to 'image' ( Zjye ), once 
with reference to 'colour' (^ ):
16 9: image: in the mirror:
’is it an accident or an essence, or a thing
and reality, or illusion?'
( ^ ^  f'
173: colour in the peacock's tail:
'what is it, do you say that it does not have
reality, but only changes colour on confrontation, 
or do you say that there is colour there in its 
own right and the rest is illusion?'
c  c  u/ c  u/c e
L * )
( <y y  ^
(e ) confrontation
The other principal question under the rubric of resemb­
lance is that of site. If images are indistinguishable as 
identities/ are they also indivisible in site? This is 
related to the problem of reality, and to whether they are 
bodies, and if not whether they must come from somewhere 
else, the suggestion being 'confrontation' (iLUu). Jahiz 
presents the problem in two different ways: first, one site
of confrontation and the choice between an image or a 
'confrontation'; second, two images seen, but only one site 
of confrontation.
Thus, in §168: image or 'confrontation':
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'just as he who confronts the pupil sees the image 
of a person and there is no image there, but only 
in confrontation'
w .
I*-* I AjytP liJ 1 i Pi L**w t d£ 1 (J-' b '^ rJ~
( 1L tsj \ JLUl Ju>-^  c ^
and in § 172: two images:
'and what do you say about the band of red and the 
band of green and how do they differ, as the air is 
the same and what confronts them is the same?'
c llS)„l.'Lj-1 JI d J U j b  JI djL^_b J L  j
( kXJ*"- l-SU I4J
(f) collapse
The most complex situations are worded in such a way 
that identity and site are inextricable, and these are 
schematically presented in Chart I. Suffice it to say here 
that these concern confusion of seer and seen in the mirror 
($169, 170) and that of seeing, seer and seen in the pupil 
(§168). Thus, man may be the subject (face), the object 
(image), and the surface of encounter (pupil) as well as 
the means of vision (pupil). The intermediary, the surface, 
the signifier, is quite arbitrary; it can be a sword or 
stagnant water (§167), but the phenomenon of resemblance 
is a kind of telescoping, in which the separateness of these 
elements is lost on the observer, in a confusion of mirror 
images.
5.2.2 Contiguity
This telescoping seems to be what Jahiz is indicating 
here; on the other hand, when he considers contiguity,
separateness of identities is implicit: in question is their
relation to one another, the effect things have on one another
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by touching in space, or sharing the same space. Paragraphs 
169 and 170 contain most of the semic possibilities in a 
range from positive (creation) to negative (cancellation), 
schematically presented (disregarding, for the moment, 
interrogative and negative syntax):
§169 §170
cause, create cancel
< ^ i )  < 4 > > ( j M >
touch act on
i S k :  ) (<y
act on its scope
( ) <>-)
cancel touching
( J-J-^) ( 1*4 )
continuous
( S ^ )
collision 
( j. J La,)
(a) cancellation
As seen in this schema, moving from paragraph 169 to 
170, causation disappears and there is refinement of con­
tiguity, not only variations of touching, but the idea of 
a shared site. Basically, there are two questions here: 
one, whether things can have an effect on one another if 
they do not touch; and two, the recurrent problem of two 
things in one site and the proposal that one must cancel 
the other, phrased here in the ‘realist* terms of image
i
and body:
For a similar 'problem' in rhetoric, see below: 7.2.
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'and if it did not cancel it, then there are two 
images in one body'
( y  q  Jl d L y  dia.1 j£, ^
(b ) alternation
In paragraphs 175 and 178, Jahiz proposes another 
solution to this problem of two things on one site, that 
of alternation. With reference to the tides, it is a 
question of alternate forces:
§175:
'. . . that ebb and flow are from the same attractions
when (the moon) pulls and when it pushes'
( £-9 J ! J | j  I o  J ly d  1 y  jj->J U*J 1^ 1 )
With reference to light, it is phrased in terms of body and
attribute:
§178:
'is it a body found on the disappearance of light, or 
by the interpretation of our saying "darkness" do we 
only mean the repulsion of the light, and if dark- 
ness is an attribute, do you then see it tapped irrp® 
the earth and concealed during the diffusion of light?' 
** f U y  cyd1 Jljjj aip Jyry )
^UaJl 1^5" eybJl
( y iJ  1 J=> L«ww' I
(c) contradiction
Whether darkness is a body or an attribute, it is still 
substantial enough to require alternation with light, and 
if not, the problem of self-contradiction might be posed, 
thus:
§178:
'and if it is independent, why are they not mutually
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contradictory, and if they interfere with each other 
then how do we not see both of them in the vision of 
the eyes?'
U_a> ji q \? ,jIj UiLi- *-jL^  Lit? 1^5* 1^^ )
This is the problem which appeared at the beginning of the 
section, the problem of the reflection of two things on one 
surface, and of the surface, again, at the conclusion of the 
section as the personal image: one's eyes.
(d ) concurrence
The option in acceptance of collapse in the resemblances 
of mirror images (see above: 5.2.1(f)) is to accept dual
images, or dual perceptive faculties, and this also is not 
without its confusions.
§168: dual images:
'and why do some mirrors show the face and the
neck and show the head inverted?’
( L v 2 u  \j] I \Sjz} L&J l_j I \Sjt I j ^  ^
§170: dual faculties:
'and how do we see the difference, how is it,
as rays are colour and white, and the sentient
soul does not grasp anything about the senses?'
L - j  ^ ^ —aJ L>uJ I j j  )
( cr A m i
(e) subjectivity
Thus Jahiz, on the phenomena of nature, indicates 
explicitly and implicitly where confusions can arise in 
dependence on sense perception: we 'see' and estimate, but
there will always be discrepancies. Some of these arise
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naturally from our position as subject: sense perception
is confused if there is too little removal in space of 
subject from object {the baroque image of the pupil) and 
also vulnerable if there is too great a removal in space 
(judging the shape of the stars, the origin of thunder,etc.)
5.3 The Word
So far, I have looked at the questions in this section 
in terms of the scientific: problems and proposed solutions
However, as was observed in The Case - II: Supra-sensory,
there seem to be no proposals in a systematic sense. If 
sense perception is difficult to comprehend and describe, 
one is led to the problem of the expressive capacity of 
language, in order to analyse more fully its epistemological 
ba'ses. I will briefly consider syntactic manipulations and 
semic fields, and begin by comparing Jahiz‘s approach with 
his near contemporary, al-Kindi (Jahiz: d. 868, Kindi: d. 
873) known as one of Islam's first speculative philosophers. 
The subjects he treats are often .the same as those of Jahiz. 
He treats the problem of 'essence' and 'accident' (Jahiz^ 
§169 - 5. 2 .1 (d)) and, considering ‘body* must make reference 
to 'length* and 'width* (Jahiz: A.W.). Thus, it is clear
that so far as subject is concerned, Kindi deals with these 
issues as abstractions, while Jahiz purposely mixes the 
abstract and the concrete.
5.3.1 Syntax
It is in the area of syntax that Jahiz and Kindi most 
blatantly diverge. Kindi’s syntax aims at a definition of
See below: 10.1.2 for this form of 'Aufhebung*.
90
things, a reduction of possibilities, in an attempt to 
identify final oppositions, to force a choice one way or 
another. He presents a situation, worded in negative and 
positive terms, thus:
‘either . . . or . . . and if it is not . . . then
i
it is . . .'
( . , . t ^
Then, as solution, by the law of contradiction, he comes
to a conclusion recurrent in his First Philosophy:
in terms of negative-positive:
'then it is not itself, and it is itself, and that
2is an impossible contradiction'
( ^ *-i Lftj y& yJt, ^ )
or in terms of antithetical qualities:
'so the part resembles the whole; that is an 
impossible contradiction'
( ^ t I 9^
Kindi's style is not totally without the elasticity 
of analogy, but he uses it rarely. It appears sometimes 
in visual images 'like a b a t 1  ^ or through simple
endoxy: 'just as we say . . .' ( J ^ L S *).5
(a) analogy
On the whole Jahiz's argumentation is more elastic, 
and there are the same two areas to examine: one, the
frequency and use of analogyf two, the way in which choices
are presented, in other words, means of extension, and
“     -----------------------------
al-Kindi, First Philosophy (Cairo, 1948), p. 77.
Ibid., p. 59.
Ibid., p . 49.
Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid., p. 159.
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means of reduction of argument.
Jahiz uses analogy more frequently, both in implicit 
and explicit forms. There are two implicit kinds, one:
similar syntax and/or expression for different problems: 
verb a - subject a: problem x 
verb a - subject a: problem y 
so, in §161:
*1 know that I hear, but I do not recognize the 
modality . . .  *
‘I know that I see, but I do not recognize the 
modality . . .  1
* i r
the other:
repeated use of a particular expression for a series 
of questions; in this case, the recurring expression is 
'tell me about . . . how . . .’
_ w
( ‘-ip . . . ^
This expression may sound rather meaningless in its 
banality, but it is noticeable that it recurs only in certain 
forms of discourse. In paragraphs 165 and 166, for instance, 
which seem to interrupt and change the subject, this 
expression is absent, and instead explicit analogy is used, 
here through the expression: as/similar to { Ji.)
§165:
'and had they looked into it as I did'
L J"* ^  b L?)
A
§166:
'but you had permitted (questions) similar to 
those of Hermes' ( ^J> c-jjf ui
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Furthermore, marking a separateness of these paragraphs, 
this expression, ‘similar t o 1, does not reappear in the 
following paragraphs; the elements are related by another 
explicit analogical expression: ‘thus it is 1 (cJJJi’)l
§167:
'mirror . . . and thus it is with every smooth
polished' ( tj-JUf J5* dUi^)
For Jahiz‘s use of analogy through visual metaphors, 
see the schematizations of Chart II, particularly those
i
perennial images Derrida calls ‘ 1 1 o'eil metaphorique 1 and 
11 ‘heliotrope‘.^
(b) choice
If analogy extends Jahiz‘s arguments in this section, 
what devices does he use to restrict inquiry, to. bring about 
choice? Despite the fact that many questions are asked, 
and many proposals put forward, one may say that he groups 
his choices either by twos, or (less frequently) by threes. 
Choice by two occurs in the following ways: 
between negative and positive:
§164: ‘do they express what they do not know, or
express what they do know?'
( L- q  LsJra
between two antithetical terms;
§162: ‘is it by necessity or acquisition?'
(wL^Sl J
between two pairs, whether synonymous:
§164: 'by experience and deduction
J. Derrida, 'La Mythologie Blanche', Podtique, 5 (Paris, 
1971) ,p38.
2
Ibid., p. 35. For more on Jahiz's use of analogy through
images, see below: 8.4.1.
93
and by perfect material and excellent instrument'
(lit J 14 ;ij fe  ^
or antithetical:
§169: 'accident or essence
or a thing and reality, or illusion'
( ^  “g-it
Choice between three alternatives is more rare, but 
occurs in terms which seem to be legitimate choices, not 
just automatisms of the antithetical.
§175; on the tide's ebb and flow:
'an angel . . . attractive force . . . 
sympathetic force'
( *LU 1—  Jl>- ♦ . . . . tflL)
§178; on the nature of darkness:
'a body . . .  an attribute . . .  a disc . , ,'
(t ^ ■ *• . . .
(c) contradiction
Though at times this syntax seems hardly more expansive
than that of Kindi, striking is the fact that there is never
a conclusion, by definition, that something must be either 
1
A or non-A. The law of contradiction and its corollary, 
the law of the excluded middle, are not brought to bear by 
Jahiz. On the constructions of this law, he might agree 
with the authors of Histoire de la Logique that, 'toutes 
les difficultds s 'dvanouissent, en effet, si 1 ‘on prend garde
-
Though Adad feels he can detect Jahiz*s preferences, 
i.e. on the theory of ebb and flow, op. cit., note p. 308,
I cannot say they are clear to m e .
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de ne pas oublier que les objets £tudi£s peuvent ne pas 
exister1.^
5.3.2 Semantics
(a) universe
It has been pointed out that Kindi treats subjects 
similar to those of Jahiz, but on an abstract plane, and 
that he presents these largely in antithetical terms (part- 
whole) . In contrast, Jahiz's semic field is wide, concrete, 
abstract, and variegated. It is not merely that most con­
centric world, focused in the pupil, but it is one in which
the whole universe plays a part. The four elements of the 
medieval order, fire, water, air, and earthy are present 
here, in relationship to the seen. For instance: 
fire and water: antithetical surfaces of
reflection: §167
air: exists behind the surface of the seen: $§170, 172
earth:
a place of wandering: §163
a site of illusion: §174
a site of recognition: §176
The four elements are also presented in two other
2capacities: as site of sympathies, and of knowledge. For
instance,
sharing an element can lead to effect on action:
§175: moon = water = tides
an element can be a site for knowledge:
§176: tracking: water, air, earth
-  —  .... _ _  _  
M. Boll and J. Reinhart, Histoire de la Logique (Paris, 
1980), p. 88.
2
For antipathy, see below: 6.3.2.
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an element can be a knowing entity^
§163: wind of Solomon
§173; goblet of water
(b) knowledge
In this section Jahiz actually presents more options 
than merely knowing by nature or through nature. The alter­
natives are:
learning: recognition of marks:
§176: ‘it will belong to him who has learned and 
not to him who has not Leaaraaed1
science: experience and deductions
§164: ((JLL-ZuJj 3-^t)
philosophy: necessity and actpLisitioiau:
§ 1 6 2 :  ( f
religion: supplication and Bearish s
§163: (uJiihJI
supernatural: inspiration and the extraordinary:
§ 1 6 4 ( d a L*J t\ a"-?*
wonder and text
§165: ^ Cj*3  ^ o* lJ~ ^  )
I >1? O* u^* O*
(^ * • * *4*1 * * * <3*
(c) recognition
These bodies of knowledge are mentioned in passing in 
this section; they help to set up the basic problem which 
is about ‘seeing1, and interpreting what one sees. There 
is perceptible movement of emphasis from the senses to 
language, in the following terms:
For the levels of commentary here, see below: 8.1.1.
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recognition by: 
senses: §161
marks: §176
i
oppositions: §177
interpretations: §178
5.4 The World - the Word
5.4.1 Relationships
The perceptual world and its relationships, the mark
and its interpretation, are ordering principles of a world
Jahiz describes, and which Foucault analyses in The Order
of Things. It is one in which things operate by similitudes
of different kinds.
'aemulatio* - ‘There is something in emulation of
2
the reflection and the mirror.'
'convenientia1 - ‘This word really denotes the adjacency
of places . . . their edges touch . . , 
In this way, movement, influences, 
passions, and properties too, are
3
communicated.1 
sympathies - 'sympathy transforms. It alters,
4
but in the direction of identity.1
analogy - 'it makes possible the marvellous
confrontation of resemblances across 
.5space.1
This seems similar to Jahiz's world of resemblance, contiguity
-j
For knowledge by oppositions in language, see below: 6.2.3
2
M. Foucault, The Order of Things (London, 1974), p. 19.
 ^ Ibid., p. 18.
 ^ Ibid., p . 23.
5 Ibid., p. 21.
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and sympathies in the seen, and his use of analogy for the 
1said.
5.4.2 Mark - Word
However, as Foucault points out, in trying to find the 
marks of resemblances between things, 'superimposition
2necessarily includes a slight degree of non-coincidence'.
Even in terms of modern science, Thomas Kuhn writes, 'No 
process disclosed by the historical study of scientific 
development at all resembles the methodological stereotype
3
of falsification by direct comparison with nature.' What
Jahiz shows in this section is that what cannot be known
for certain by the senses may nonetheless be expressed by
words. If it seems physically impossible for two images
to be in one place at once, it is not impossible in metaphor
and analogy, to say two things at once. In Chart II: Analogy,
it is clear that in many paragraphs a sense perception problem
can only be expressed in this way. Language belongs to world
and word. As Foucault writes,
There is no difference between the visible marks that 
God has stamped upon the surface of the earth, so 
that we may know its inner secrets, and the legible 
words that the Scriptures have set down in the books 
preserved for us by tradition.^
He goes on to say, 'In other words, "divinatio" and
5
"eruditio" are both part of the same hermeneutics.'
1
This also corresponds to Jakobson's linquistic axis of 
coherence, see above: 0.2.3.
2
Foucault, op. cit., p. 39.
3
T. Kuhn.The Structures of Scientific Revolutions 
(Chicago, 1970), p. 77.
4
Foucault, op. cit., p. 33.
I b i d . , p . 34 .
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5.4.3 Interpretation
Hermeneutics, of course, implies not just 'reading'
but the interpretative step. As Foucault adds, 'Furthermore,
language gives rise to two other forms of discourse which
provide it with a frame; above it, there is commentary . . .
1
and below it, the text.' Kuhn even extends this to
science; 'Science students accept theories on the authority
2of teacher and text, not because of evidence.' Therefore, 
it is not at all surprising that many of the analogies 
Jahiz gives are preceded by the expression: ‘the saying*
3
(J*Ul) and that the subsequent demand for authority is to 
ask for interpretation of a saying:
§178: 'or by the interpretation of our saying
darkness, do we either mean . . .  1
The word is, like the surface of the mirror, only an arbitrary
element between the signifier and the signified. It is a
social convention which needs interpretation, which has no
4
meaning out of context.
Foucault, op. cit., p. 42.
Kuhn, op. cit., p. 80.
F o r ‘the saying' as the known, see above: 4.4.1.
See below: 8.4.
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Chapter Six
JOKE - I: EXEMPLIFICATION
The material of the risala, the questions (Riddle),
i j
quotations (Memorabilia), the phrasing of its speculations 
on the world (Case I, II, III), are all intermittently dis­
rupted in ways attributed to Jahiz's 'particular style' of 
'coq-a-1’dne'. I intend to analyse these disruptions in 
terms of an epistemological search, here, that of identifying 
the norm through exemplification, syntax, and semantics.
Joke I, II and III display this by relations between words 
and contexts, in excess, dislocation, and ambiguity.
6.1 Identity - Controversy
6.1.1 Reference
O
As mentioned in the introduction (^ K. 1.1) the identity
of the addressee of the risala is not certain. Nevertheless,
both Pellat and Adad have tried to situate him in historical
terms. Pellat writes:
[Jahiz] . . . ne jette qu'une clartd insuffisante sur
son identity. II en ressort principalement qu'Ahmad 
ibn cAbd al-Wahhab dtait tr&s agd, rdsidait h. la 
Mekke apres avoir vdcu dans la familiarity du vizier 
Ibn az-Zayyat, manifestait son predilection pour le 
Si'isme, mais se montrait inaccessible a la 
discussion.
Adad writes, 'Al-Gahiz, quant & lui (A.W.), ne nous parle 
que d'un poldmiste detestable, laid physiquement et
Pellat, op. cit., p. VII. 
2 Ibid., p. X.
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moralement mais bouffi de prdtention qu'il est devenu
1
urgent de remettre a sa place.’ Taken as address to an 
unattractive 'real' person, this discourse register could 
be seen as vituperative and gratuitous.
6.1.2 ’Preuves hors technique*
Though historical verification of A.W.'s identity may
be difficult, it does not mean that his importance is
negligible. In terms of rhetoric, argument depends on
2
'preuves techniques' and 'preuves hors technique', in other 
words, internal and external witness. A.W. plays a role 
in both these: first, as adversary in the risala, with a 
'name' to represent his discourse (external); second, as 
subject, a character to be portrayed in particular terms 
(internal). These are the two aspects Abd El-Fattah Kilito 
describes in his article 'L'Auteur de Paille', 'II est . . . 
ndcessaire de choisir soigneusement le nom qui couvrira le 
discours et fixera 1 'attitude que le recepteur doit adopter 
k  son dgard.' Thus, for Jahiz's 'questions' a 'respondent' 
must be created. Second, with reference to hadith literature,
b
Kilito writes: ' 1' autfenticitd . . . ddpendera du jugement
que l'on portera sur l'int£gritd morale de ceux qui le
4
transmettent.' The respondent must be presented in 
unflattering terms; by maligning the author of a discourse, 
one maligns that discourse.
1
Adad, op. cit., p. 269.
2
M. Dufour, 'Analyse du livre I I 1, Aristote, Rhdtorique 
(Paris, 1967), II,p,15.
3
A. Kilito, 'L'Auteur de Paille', Po^tique, 44 (Paris,
1 980) ,pj400.
^ I b i d ., p . 404.
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6.1.3 ‘Preuves techniques*
This phenomenon of maligning a discourse through its 
author extends, of course, to a wider field than that of 
hadith literature, as is clear in the poetj^ic genres of 
praise and blame through boast (j^) and satire )-
Furthermo're, the topoi are stock perennial versions of the 
acceptable-unacceptable. As Aristotle writes, 'Ce qui n'est 
pas un exc&s est un bien, et ce qui est plus grand qu'il ne
i
faudrait est un mal .1 On cannot blame A.W. if he is short, 
but one can if he is excessively short, and his counter­
claim is equally excessive. Thus, the terms of debate are 
found in Jahiz's first sentence: claim and excess:
§1: 'Ahmad ibn 'Abdul Wahhab was excessively short,
and he claimed that he was excessively.tall'
( t -bjS* dJ I ^  J05 j*akl I Jz>jSu v— < \ Jus- ^  Ju->-l ^15*)
also in \
§2 : claim and ignorance:
'and his claims to types of knowledge in 
proportion to his ignorance of them'
§1 : age and quar^ity:
‘and he was very old1 ( j y S  ,jl^ )
§2 : contentiousness and quantity:
1 and he was very contentious1
Thus, by internal exposition, A.W. becomes immediately the 
focus for the ideas of controversy and extreme.
Aristote, Rhdtorique, I,p97.
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6.2 Semantic Focus - Semantic Slide
This technique establishes an unattractive adversary, 
and, by extension, one of dubious reliability. Since it 
cannot be, proved that A.W. was short or tall, let alone old, 
ignorant, and contentious, instead of considering the 
argument unimportant for lack of external reference, it 
should be viewed as one with its own internal dynamics.
Jahiz's language is never gratuitous, he is a serious styl­
ist and polemicist. The risala is an almost Proustian 
complex of lexical and semic appearances, disappearances, 
and reappearances. Through A.W., excess has been established 
as initial focus, but it emerges that excess is not limited 
to A.W., let alone his physiognomy; Pellat's glossary
includes lexical references by paragraph through which one
1can follow such semic movement. I will scan the risala 
for use of the word 'excess' and its synonyms, or antonyms, 
to identify semantic focus by following semantic slide.
6.2.1 Excess
The lexeme 'excess' (J=l^ ii) appears in various grammatical 
forms in connection with the described, the describer, and 
the description.
(a) described:
§1: physiognomy of A.W. (see above)
§18: physiognomy of others:
'So Muhammad claimed that he only exceeded in 
elegance . . . because the excess of his 
height . . .
There are 31 paragraphs examined here: 1/11/13/16/17/18/
19/37/47/84/8 6/88/89/9 5/96/105/10 8/111/113/117/128/136/137/ 
144/158/159/179/187/198/202/203.
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'and Ahmad claimed that he only exceeded in width 
. . . because the excess of his width . . .'
( <x*0jS > Js> \ j $  |  ^ ^  - b ' j-9 ^ I*-' J. <*-' J )
§108: physiognomy per se
'and he whose beauty has the flaw of excess'
q J )
(b) describer:
§98: Jahiz: emotion
'and the excess of my unease' ( S=,\y\^)
§105: Jahiz: style
'so do not wonder . . . that I am excessive'
(2=>j & *  3ls)
(c) description:
§117: style per se
'and seriousness invites excess’
( Js> \jS ^  I I 1*^ 1 J Ju>j U )
6.2.2 Surpassing
It is in this same paragraph, 117, that a synonymic 
slide is made; the lexeme 'excess' is echoed by that of 
'surpassing' (Jj^r) and does not reappear. To identify in 
what ways its semic value is replaced and/or extended, I 
will follow the use of 'surpassing', which appears also in 
connection with: described, describer, description.
(a) described:
§19: physiognomy: specific
'width which surpasses the measure'
(j  jaJ.I
'height which surpasses the goal'
( wUqa!) iJj-bj )
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§19: physiognomy: general
1. . . the body surpasses good measure and
surpasses good proportion . . . and surpasses
good proportion . . .’
( » * ♦ J *   ^ I yz <-i s .■ J t i' y* uV «,>' 1 ^
(b) describer-description
§84: Jahiz: emotion-style
'I was apprehensive about surpassing its measure'
( Cj JuLl ajj L^-*J I y  CiJLLJi )
§105: A.W. : emotion-style
'and he dislikes exaggeration'
(j y r^ ' O *  y h v )
(c) description:
§117: style per se
'just as joking invites the surpassing of measure' 
(j UaJI Sji^ U-4 j
Briefly stated, 'excess' and 'surpassing' have been 
used synonymously, applied to appearances, (the described) 
ranging from the specific focus of A.W. to abstract quality 
(see Chart I). Also, by means of the describer, they were 
both applied to modes of description (see Chart II).
There are differences in their use, however. 'Excess' 
is usually employed with claims or allegations, and flaw. 
'Surpassing', on the other hand, is always bounded (except 
in the fifth form used above) by some limit, some criteria, 
however vague the terms may be (see Chart III).
There is one instance in which the boundary to 'sur-
w
passing' is not a vague 'measure' ( ^ ja) or 'limit' ( jlp-) ,
-  _____
This an anomalous form; it does not fit the usual under­
standing of the fifth form (tolerate). I am using Pellat's 
translation; Adad gives 'm£taphore'.
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but rather, description:
§13: word: per se
'and extravagance is that which surpasses 
generosity' ( L J!_>)
6.2.3 Mistake
The semic field of 'surpassing' is further extended 
from its association with 'excess' to an association with 
'mistake' ( ) , notably on the subject of 'joking'.
(a) description-describer:
§84: Jahiz: emotion-style
'and I was apprehensive about surpassing its 
measure [see above] as joking is a chapter in 
which abbreviation is not to be feared, and 
mistake in it is not in the direction of 
inadequacy'
d-j-S I ^j— ' I I I U tj )
( jjjUa5_J 1 ^4
This is followed by two more associations of 'joking' and 
'mistake':
(b) description:
§84: style
'because it is a category the basis of whose 
establishment is mistake'
( 1  ^*—■ L aJ')!)
§96: style
‘mistake is faster to (appear in) joking*
( ^ t  j-ijji jitki-ji 0 \) 
'Joking', of course, has to do with Jahiz's description of 
A.W., and in paragraph 89 this connection is made:
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(c) description - described - describer:
§89: Jahiz*s style - Jahiz1s perception
'and if I made a mistake, I did not make a 
mistake about anything but you'
(eh VI CL-tiaj-f 0*5" (J^ )
In paragraph 86, both 'surpassing' and 'mistake* are used 
on this subject: intermingling of description-perception:
(d) description-describer:
§86: A.W.*s discourse - Jahiz*s perception
'and if I had not . . . and not surpassed the 
limit . . . so, by what would I know . . . and 
if I had mistaken the way, and surpassed the 
limit of good measure'
. . .  t— l**9 . . . f • |J 0*5* ^ )
( j 1.3.9.4J I Jj*" I C- Up 0*5* q
In paragraph 202, Jahiz's whole text is perhaps mistaken, 
due to inadvertences of perception.
§202: Jahiz's text - Jahiz's perception
'and if we [sic.. ] made a mistake, it was not 
from . . .'
( . . . Li L' 15* £ )
Jahiz's ability to describe A.W. is thus interwoven
with his ability to know, to perceive what he is (§89) and
what his discourse is (§86). Thus far, his use of the word
'mistake* has been either in connection with its role in
'joking*, or in his own 'mistaking*. Thus, mistaking on
his part, the ambiguity of whether it is in his description 
r
or in his pejjception, is pivotal in carrying the word from
the context of style to that of the epistemological:
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recognizing the bases of mistake. In this area, Jahiz 
presents three possible approaches: the perceptual, the
dialectical, and the exemplary; in other words, external 
witness by sense or exemplum, or internal witness through 
conceptual oppositions, and these appear in the following 
ways:
(a) perception:
$16: senses: specific
'on my life, surely eyes can be mistaken'
( c ' O  i )
$17: senses: general
'despite the mistake of the senses’
( JI tki- c5I&)
The perceptual and the exemplary are mixed in our perception 
of * others' behaviour:
$88: apprehension: behaviour
‘and of the motives of mistake with regard to 
it . . .'
C . . . *JI o.)
Another combination, the perceptual and dialectical, 
appear together in paragraphs 179 and 128. In paragraph 
179, Jahiz posits knowing pleasure without knowing pain:
(b) perception - dialectic:
$179: sensations - oppositions
'and if that were permissible, then he who is 
ignorant of the mistake would know what is 
correct'
( I qa u- l^ *aJ I til] J J L>- ytj )
In paragraph 128, he posits knowing physical qualities by 
antonyms:
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§128: qualities - oppositions
’the mind does not mistake it and the senses do 
not lie about it'
( I d-;S —■ ^yA JJI <j_J> '^ k s t^  *)l L , . . )
In paragraph 11, he posits knowledge of the abstract, i.e. 
truth, through knowledge of synonyms and antonyms:
§11: abstractions - oppositions
'and he who does not know the mistake is ignorant 
of what is correct'
( <—• I fk->J i V j  )
In paragraph 128, Jahiz notes, specifically, in what 
areas mistake is likely to arise:
§128: mistake of the senses ( Iks-)
mistake of the imagination ( pftjJ I Lk^ -)
mistake of opinion ( ^f^ jl tkj-)
The examples above from paragraphs 16/17/128/179 are evidence 
of the first; the examples, below, in paragraphs 136/137/
198/203 are evidence of the third.^
2
(d) exemplum:
§203: mistake:
'for mistakes are numerous and overflowing . . . 
and the correct few and special’
( ^ jp U- Ij^aJ j y S  IkiJ I (j[i)
§136: rebellion
'and how did it happen that the prophet, accord­
ing to you [pi.], rebelled and did not err, and 
the imam did not rebel and did not err'
( *(3^ ^  ^ |* j U J i J )
1 “ “ ' ' '
For the second: imagination and mistake, see below: 8.3.
2
For similar partial reference, see above: 3.5.2.
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§198: expectation
'whoever mistakes them and expects is in a worse 
situation than he who does not mistake them and 
does not expect'
( I f  ..f Lfctiab-f y*3 )
1
§137: 'evangelicum1
'and we have learned that it is not permissible 
for a materialist/eternalist to become a 
prophet'
i Cj—^  ^  t 'if n^t 1 Lib )
6.2.4 Permissible
Both in paragraph 179, which deals with sensations as 
oppositions, and in paragraph 136, which deals with actions 
as oppositions, the word 'permissible* ( )  was .connected 
to 'mistake' in hypothetical opposition. Turning from 
synonymy to antonymy does 'permissible' in its sense here 
emerge as a more specific criterion than the 'limit' words 
used to block 'surpassing'? It is used in the following 
ways:
(a) the world: 
of nature:
§47: physical behaviour
'is it permissible that something act on something 
without its being acted on'
§179: sensation (see above)
See above: 2.3.2 and J. Wansbrough, 'Concept of "a
prophet for every nation"', Quranic Studies (Oxford, 1977), 
p. 54.
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of men:
§159: social behaviour
'on that which it is not permissible to correspond'
( £ ] <Lj tlJ I jy r - t ^ UJ)
§136: religious behaviour
' and /i^is) permissible for a prophet to be an 
unbeliever'
I ,| ( o f  jyrt
' . . . elj&  that was not permissible in a single
imam'
( L^l J > eUJ
(b) the word
§12: the hermetic:
‘and what is the obscure which it is not permissible 
to separate from its obscurity'
( dS I \jL. 'j f jJ I (jl  <  1 I L«j )
§19: the attribution:
'surely if this description is permissible'
( Jl IJl a j U -
§144: the learned:
'and if not, it would be permissible that this 
qasida be forgotten instead of that one'
c «/
( C,ll j J i*L d t d wJaij ^ I JLSL9 )
§187: the 1 said' :
'and is their saying about . . . permissible'
( * * * iy j y ^  J-*j)
The range here, from nature to discourse, is very wide, but
from a semantic point of view, the word 'permissible' seems
to convey the acceptable, the norm.
Also striking in these instances of 'permissible' is
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that the syntax is consistently interrogative, hypothetical 
or negative. (See Chart IV.) There are only two cases in 
which the syntax is positive, and in these the word is to 
be understood, rather, as 'going through'. They are the 
following:
§111: 'and you [A.W.} go through the utmost limit'
( UJI )
C r>\ p A
§37: 'and you have gone through the nun^ier of Bawarat'
/
( cL/ L-JI l c i )
It is clear that both could also be translated as 'surpassing'.
If 'surpassing' and 'permissible' can be confused, limits
vague, and 'excess' seemingly unblocked, the idea of positive
i
criteria remains in abeyance.
6 .3 Exemplum - Text
It is the negative semes which dominate in this dis­
course register. Conspicuous are the mechanisms by which 
associations are made, and the particular area of emphasis, 
of cumulative focus. First, there is the ambivalence of 
the describer's role. Some semes related to the respondent 
(A.W.) are shared by the questioner (Jahiz). With reference 
to irony and satire, Jolles writes, '. . . l a  parentd entre
le moqueur et l'objet de sa moquerie peut amener ceux-ci
2a s'identifier de plus en plus.' However, in the uses
of 'surpassing' and 'mistake' the syntax of the hypothetical
exculpates Jahiz. (See Chart V.) Second, these words are
applied in contexts ranging from the very concrete to the
very abstract, a movement which begins at one level with 
_
For other positive criteria, see above: 3,2.2.
2
Jolles, op. cit., p. 203.
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the described (A.W.) and concludes at another with description 
per se (text). Furthermore, this coincidence in the realm 
of 'excess' (A.W.: §1; text: §105) makes it clear that
this discourse register is about 'excess', and is, itself, 
excessive.
6.3.1 Joke
(a) negative
It is the discourse register of the Joke < ci > m ,  and 
another instance of the coincidence of • ’mddiatisd‘ and
'mediateur'. As Jolles writes, 'le comique ne s'oppose pas
K 1 
au bl&mable ou a 1' insuf f isant, mais au sdvere'. Accord-
2
ingly, argument in terms of the 'case' is on the merits
Mr
of 'joking* versus 'seriousness' ( . Furthermore, in
this register, one does not have one element without the 
other. As Erasmus writes in his introduction to Eloge de 
la Folie, 'rien n'est plus spirituel que de faireservir les 
frivolitds a des choses sdrieuses'. This is a moralistic 
genre, and its negative side is creation of characters as 
exemplifications. Erasmus proceeds to describe various 
excessive characters, as a foil for his serious alternative, 
one who would undertake a basic re-cognition of the 
Scriptures. Moliere also exposes a range of excessive 
characters, and ironically it is Tartuffe, the excessive, 
who is memorable, not Cldante, the moderate.
(b) positive
This is the positive, or creative, side of the Joke. 
Jolles points out that the comic author, 'essaye de ddnouer 
f
Jolles, op. cit., p. 204.
2
See above: 1.2.
3
Erasme, Eloge de la Folie (Paris, 1964), p. 14.
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et de ddfaire l'dldment bldmable . . . il rdussit . . . k
transformer et mdme h nouer ces memes caracteres en formes
dldmentaires trfes positivement individualisees.' So, A.W.
comes to exist, as an historical persona. Nonetheless, the
2
topoi in which he is described are transferable. Thus, 
when Irenaeus writes about the (heretical) Gnostic, it is 
in these terms, 'He walks with a strutting gait and a super­
cilious countenance,possessing all the pompous air of a
3
cock.1 In a similar manner, in paragraph 6 , Jahiz refers
to A.W. with these lines of 'poetry':
§6 : ‘more stubborn in his stubbornness than the beetle
and more haughty when he walks than the crow'
* +
cLmJjpJ t q * U-U-J
( i_. \jz ^  L j j.
6.3.2 Norm
(a) negative
In this discourse register, no matter what type of char­
acter is created, the transportable topoi are invariably 
phrased in terms of excess,'of going beyond. At the end 
of the Eloge, Erasmus has Folly say, 'mais depuis longtemps,
4
je m'oublie et j'ai franchi toute borne'. This idea of 
surpassing the limits of the acceptable can also be seen 
in terms of mistake. Elaine Pagels observes that the New
5
Testament word for sin is 'hamartia', missing the mark.
This is also an image Jahiz uses, as follows:
- - ~  _  _ _ _ _ _
Jolles, op. cit., p. 206.
2
See below: 9.1.2.
 ^ Quoted in E. Pag^yis, The Gnostic Gospels (New York), p. 39.
 ^ Attributed to Lucian in Erasmus, op. cit., p. 94.
5
Pagels, op. cit., p. 123.
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§19: 'and when width does not hit with its arrow
. . . surpasses good proportion'
( I L>*J . . . yjPj1*J ^ ^  (S'*} ^
This is even more clear in the sense that the cop|tant antonym
here for ’mistake* is 'correct1 whose verbal form means ‘to
hit the mark1:
§202: 'for if we hit the mark, it was the correct
we were aiming at, and if we were mistaken . . .’
( . . . btkJ uf oi, . . . b G S " o p )
(b) positive
The goal, the measure, etc. are the terms used to limit 
'surpasssing' in the risala. It has been pointed out that 
they seem vague and abstract, but they do state that there 
is a norm, and beyond that there is the ab-normal, the 
excessive. Defining who is outside the norm is, customarily, 
the way in which the norm defines itself, not the other way 
around, as shown in The Gnostic Gospels. When Jahiz lauds 
the method of 'knowing the correct by knowing the mistake' 
(paraphrase: §11) he is not just writing about its advisability
in the abstract, but is exemplifying this through A.W.: a
figure excessive in size, age, ignorance, and contentiousness. 
This is neither vituperative nor gratuitous; one makes 
ridiculous in order to establish an alternative, a new norm, 
with its concomgdfitant vocabulary: 'excess' is/is not
‘permissible‘.
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CHART V
Jahiz!s involvement: hypothetical: the Describer
§ Surpassing Mistake
84 Cj i-XsJ djj I t—J) 9 «* I
86
^  fa • * * oP  
^  oi? (3 ^j-UJ I JL5 d j 5" I
89
202 L*ti=0-t as U5*
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Chapter Seven
JOKE - II: SYNTAX
7.1 Different Contexts - Different Words?
Joke-I was an analysis of the role played by a word, 
namely, ’excess', both in its linear infections by synonymies 
and atonymies, and in its non-linear implications, namely, 
its semantic possibilities in different contexts, its use 
of polysemy. In Joke-II I will concentrate on contexts 
themselves, on the syntactic patternings which cause semantic 
change, using terms borrowed from classical rhetoric, and 
principles inherent in structuralism.
The fact that a word can have a quite different impact, 
or connotation, in different contexts is a commonplace, but 
often the analysis of this has focused on the word, not the 
context. As Max Black writes, '. . . i t  would be good to 
understand how the presence of one frame can result in 
metaphorical use of the complementary word, while the pres­
ence of a different frame for the same word fails to result
i
in metaphor.'
When translating faced with the repetition of the same 
words, not exactly metaphorically changed, but transformed 
in their impact by use in different contexts (as was 
’excess'), one could try to translate by use of different 
words in different contexts. This Adad does, in a passage
M. Black, Models and Metaphors (London, 1981), p. 28.
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i
extending from paragraph 90 to 102. One can understand 
why he does, as the passage is one of gargantuan hyperbole, 
largely using repetition of identical words in the first 
part, synonyms in the second part, and constantly contrast­
ing these with antonyms. It not only seems tiresome, but 
does not look like a coherent argument; it is full of what 
are known as ‘empty rhetorical flourishes1.
7.2 Rhetoric o r JEcart*
I would like to look at the question of whether the
words in this passage do present an argument by looking,
precisely, at their contexts (Black's 'frames'), or more
specifically, the syntactic manipulations of context which
are known as 'rhetorical'. A style of constant repetition
and contradiction can be treated in two ways. One, it can
be regarded as 'rhetorical', brimming with nameable devices.
Two, it can be regarded as language's self-conscious
reflection on the problem of expression itself.
The first point of view (realist) is a classical view,
2
based on the idea of sense by essence, not relation. It
assumes a reality which transcends language, and which
language can state simply and directly if it so chooses.
To choose not to, is to choose to substitute other words
for the 'real' one, or to speak in a detour which adds 'une
noblesse, une force, une gr&ce' . Thus, assuming a first
'real* meaning for a word implies that the choice of any
other is an intentional fault, that rhetoric has its bases
in conscious linguistic anomalies. This fault, to put it
_
See below: 7.5.
2
Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1955), p. 32.
3
P. Fontanier, Les Figures du Discours (Paris, 1968), p. 223.
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another way, is subversion of the assumed coincidence of 
sign and sense, and, by extension, of the juxtalinearity 
of phrases with their thought.
The second point of view (nominalist, or structuralist) 
does not assume this original coincidence and juxtalinearity, 
but rather postulates that its absence constitutes, pre­
cisely, the nature of language. Saussure's arbitrary 
linguistic sign seeks its sense not in essence, but in 
relation. When Genette writes about the t)z(e 'synechdoche': 
sail, for ship, he points out that by this choice the sign
is now ambiguous, not unambiguous, concrete, not abstract,
2
and motivated, not arbitrary. Figure, for him, is thus 
not 'substituted' sign, or 'ddtour' in discourse, but the 
gap, the 1ecart entre le signe et le sens'. It is on this 
'dcart' which I will concentrate in discussing syntax in 
the risala.
7.3 Terms or Manipulations
Starting from the idea that sign and sense never 
coincide, and that a 'rhetorical' style is one of the most 
flagrant statements of language about its own 'fault', I 
will, however, use Fontanier's classical terms, simply 
because they are a way of signalling the multiple operations 
of '£cart', giving names to ’substitutions’. However, I
4prefer Artistotle's 'lengthened or contracted or altered', 
and will use those terms also, as they convey an idea of 
internal manipulation, rather than substitution. For this
1
Saussure, op. cit., p. 67.
2
G. Genette, Figures I (Paris, 1966), p. 219.
 ^ Ibid., p. 20 9.
4
Aristotle, Poetics (New York, 1969), p. 98.
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analysis, I will treat two areas, depending on whether a 
word, or a whole passage, is under threat of visible ecart. 
Thus, if predication is equivalent to A=B, then in the first 
case, the word, A or B, is under threat; in the second case, 
A, B, and =, i.e. their relationship, is under threat.
7.3.1 Integrity of passages
It is the second case, the integrity of passages, that 
I will discuss first. Assuming that a passage normally con­
sists of statements aiming at clear attribution and 
predication, what one finds in this series of paragraphs 
are the ‘delays1, not unlike those described by Barthes in 
his analysis of 'realist* narrative, what Fontanier would 
call a 'ddtour*. There is 'delay' by jumbling: (a) the
persons in the discourse, (b) the subject of the discourse, 
(c) the tone of the discourse. Examples of these can be
seen in the following phrases; Fontanier1s terms appear
2
in quotation marks, alongside occasional reference to their
Arabic equivalents, in parentheses.
(a) jumbling of persons:
'communication* - comment to other:
§90: 'so how . . .?'
'apostrophe' - participation of other:
§93, 94: 'so praise be to him who . . .'
. • * 0^ ^
'exclamation' - comment to and participation of 
other:
§92: ‘may God grant you long life . . .' <dJl cJU-1
( 3. .
R. Barthes, S/Z (New York, 1971), p. 75.
2
Terms found on the following pages in Fontanier: 414,
371, 370, 366, 372, 386, 367.
3
Arabic terms here apud, J. Hajjar, Traitd de Traduction 
(Beirut, 1977).
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(b) jumbling of Subject:
'correction1 - better subject: ( ciltjjcu.^ 1)
§100: 'no, rather, where i s . . . ’ • • • OtJ J* ^
different levels of subject (specific to general) 
by: (^UJl ^ \ )
'interruption' - intervening subject:
§90: 'and so it is favour . . . . .
'dpiphoneme' - concluding subject:
§102: 'and thus it is that beauty . . .'
(c) jumbling of tone:
'interrogation' - false questioning: ( 1^ ^ ,,.^ 1j. ;i 11 yi)
§100: 'and where is beauty . . .  if not in you
and . . . ' , . cdJ VJ * • •
This last is, of course, the (in)famous 'rhetorical question* 
which dominates the risala, and is prevalent in most 
hortatory literature, such as this passage from Bossuet: 
'Est-ce lui? Est-ce lui? Est-ce la cet homme qui . . .
C 'est lui . . . ' ^
These 'delays' operate upon the integrity of the verbal 
equation: what is included in it, and how it is being stated.
They are brief examples of a constant phenomenon in the 
risala: apparent stops, starts, and switching of discourse.
In other words, the 'fault' is the threat of a whole other
discourse taking over. By analogy with Aristotle's categories 
of change (albeit to a word), the first two (persons and 
subject) can be related to 'lengthening' and the third (tone) 
to 'alteration'. These operations, then, are based on
Cited in Desgranges, Les Grands Ecrivains Frangais 
(Paris, 1948), p. 256.
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syntactic manipulation of context; a threat of change of 
context is a threat to semantic integrity, the frail liaison 
between sense and sign.
7.3.2 Integrity of words
This force of context is all the more obvious when one 
deals with sign-sense liaison in individual words. The 
manipulations that I will deal with here are via: (a) rep­
etition ( j , (b) synonymy :), (c) antithesis (<jLk>)r
(d) comparison (e) hyperbole ( and
(f) irony .
(a) repetition
Though I will generally adduce only one example of each, 
it is worth looking at two examples of repetition, as they 
illustrate two different possibilities in this deceptively 
simple figure, whose formula might be represented as:
A . ..A...A... The first type can be seen in the following 
phrases, from paragraph 97:
'because joking is among those things that are some­
times ugly and sometimes beautiful, and injustice 
cannot be sometimes ugly and sometimes beautiful'
The effect here is that repetition of the same words, in 
different contexts, brings into question the continued 
identity of those words.
The second example is in the serial repetition of words,
first half of paragraph 95, or the interrogative 'is . .
( J-a) appearing sixteen times in paragraph 98. This is 
like Bossuet1s 'Quelle ardeur, quelle impatience, quelle
such as the particle 'that' ( used seven times in the
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impetuosity de ddsirs! Cette force, cette vigueur, ce sang
i
chaud . . .  1 What happens is that Bossuet and Jahiz are 
introducing more and more new elements under cover of the 
same particle. Thus, though they deal differently with 
repetition, neither passage represents stasis in one semic 
field but, rather, expansion to another.
(b) synonymy
There is a similar manipulation with synonymy, whose
formula could be represented thus: A 1...A2...A3. By being
put into a list, the synonyms look in danger of reduction
into the same, many words for one sense. A version of this
is a figure Fontanier calls 'gradation1 , and in
paragraph 94, there are at least two gradations: one series
of decrescendo, from harsh to soft, the other crescendo,
from soft to harsh. The first has to do with A.W.'s pardon
of a sinner:
Adjectives: Verbs:
wil ful ( forgive ( ^  y a. )
*
persistent t ) dislike punishing { ^  ^  ^  Uc:)
manifest ( disregard ( ^
remiss ( pardon (O^
The second concerns A.W.'s increasing power to dispose: 
except to you ( ‘Jl)C
except from you ( tik, 'Jl)
except for your discipline ( s/j)
except for your setting straight ( ,'1f ir ^  'Jj)
your obedience ( nhalU)
your sufferance {
your requirements ( uU < L)
i
Cited in Desgranges, op. cit., p. 252.
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your exhaltation ( dLJ=u*j)
Thus, instead of collapse into the same by listing in synonymy, 
movement is made across a scale of possibilities, almost 
between oppositions.
(c) antithesis
Outright oppositions, of course, abound, but their forms 
do not always have the same effect on the sign-sense liaison.
It is, thus, worth looking at two different forms of 
1antithese'. The first is in paragraph 90:
1 . . . so do it for (good) praise, and if you do not
do it for (good) praise, so do it for (good) custom,
and if you do not do it for (good) custom, so . . .*
* €
JL*J (iSJ J
( * * * d J IaJ I a 1 .w-Arf d J LaJ I  ^ i
The antithesis is hidden in repetition of words, but what
it consists of is taking one set of words and using them
in different contexts (here: positive and negative), in
a visibly onward moving argument. The formula is:
(A) context 1 - versus - (A) context 2; it is implied that 
A may not remain the same in two different contexts; it 
may have two meanings. This is the threat of expansion of 
a word, or polysemy.
An example of another type of ‘antithese’ is in 
paragraph 91, and is the kind in which two opposi^ng words
are joined by one context: i.e. (A vs. B) context. Here,
the opposing semes ‘I 1 (we) and 'you1 are contrasted in 
similar grammatical situations, starting with their use with 
particles;
’that I - with you’ llJL!
then, with prepositions:
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1 to me - against you' dJU J
'for me - on your part1 djut
1 between us - between you* 1
with nouns:
'our worth - your worth' d,o3 Ljlaif
and verbs:
'we harm - you pardon'
The sequential pairing of these antithetical semes (I-you) 
results in the impression of an opposition under threat, 
the threat of a contraction in which two differing things 
may come to mean one, and the sign lose its individual sense; 
it is the threat of a-semy.
(d) comparison
There is also frequent use of the figure 'comparaison', 
well exemplified in paragraph 93. Here, it appears in lists, 
as the formula A/B:
'your supposition - more powerful than - our certainty'
£ W
 ^1_wLc£_; tiUs )
'your intuition - more well established than - our eye
f 9 / \
witness' ( tuLc ^  dil-jij)
'your abstention - preferable to - our pains'
Here, the sense of comparison, with its claims of: bigger,
better, is in direct contradiction with the sense of the 
preceding signs, which are all on the insubstantial, ephemeral 
side. The signs, in this context, threaten their own sense: 
there is, again, potential a-semy.
(e) hyperbole
This threat of a-semy turns up in all the long lists of
_ _____ _
For comparison and context, see below: 8.4.1.
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1
exaggerated virtues of A.W., the figure known as 'hyperbole4,
and whose formula is: A* = B. One is at times faced with
a frenetic piling up of these attributes, but there is usually
always some indication of their absurdity. Such a technique
can be seen in paragraph 99, whose■increasing abstractness
//j qlmost
of praise ends in a meaningless statement:
A
1 and do you have something which goes beyond something
or something which goes beyond it, or (as is) said:
"if it were not thus, it would be better" or "if it
2
were thus it would be more perfect"'
G ^   ^^  G^  ^ (J  ^ c  ^ e gLj )
( ^   ^ G^* £  ^
(f) irony
An example such as this makes it obvious that the pane­
gyric in question is ironic. The generic term for this in 
Arabic is ) , and this species has its own name:
'confirmation .of blame through that which resembles praise'
( t; L, J^JI „ As Fontanier puts it, 'l'ironie
consiste a dire par une raillerie, ou plaisante, ou sdrieuse,
3
le contraire de ce qu'on pense'. At a more analytical level, 
irony seems to be a good example of Cohen's definition of 
'figure'. 'La figure est un conflit entre le syntagme et
4
le paradigme, le discours et le syst^me'. The syntagm
which states that A.W. is perfect is contradicted by the
_
Pellat mentions in his introduction, p. XIV, that 
anthologists later took these as models of panegyric.
2
I do not agree with A d a d 's version for this paragraph, 
neither for the beginning, where he says one must 'subtract' 
from A.W. in order to speak, nor at the end, in which he 
makes this second clause ('or if it . . .') negative also, 
thus losing all the pungency of the paradox.
3
Fontanier, op. cit., p. 145.
4
J. Cohen, Structure du Langage podtique (Paris, 1966),
p . 126.
132
paradigmatic understandings of 'A.W.' or of 'perfect'. Like 
the 'rhetorical question', this reversal of predication is 
standard in hortatory literature. Furthermore, in irony, 
though one may say the negative through the positive, one 
is usually saying both things; it is '1'oscillation entre 
les extremes et le mouvement dialectique de contraire a 
contraire qui fait tout le jeu'. Here, the oscillation 
might be between the adjectives (perfect-imperfect), the 
copula (is-is not), or the subject (A.W.-X)
7.4 Semantic Blocks
One cannot analyse further by remaining simply in 
statement as witness, here, contextual manipulations through 
features of syntax. Some brief analysis of these paragraphs 
in'terms of witness by statement is in order. Looking at 
broad semantic values in the passage, they seem to form 
three separate blocks: $§92-95, 96 and 97, 98-102, moving
from concentration on the problem of the act, to that of 
attribution, to that of essence. (See Chart I.) Pellat's 
edition acknowledges division, but he considers$96 and 97
2
part of an 'original' text, and the others 'interpolations'.
1 would argue that through textual self-referenceJ§96 and 97 
constitute definite liaison between the 'interpolated* 
paragraphs.
7.5 Act - Attribution - Essence
Though in paragraphs 90 to 96, the main subject seems 
to centre around the act, via the choices: punish-pardon,
V. Jankdldvitch, L 'ironie (Paris, 1964), p. 54.
2 See Pellat's note (1), p. VII.
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the themes of act, attribution, essence, appear and dis­
appear in most of the paragraphs, thus, in paragraph 91: 
act - attribution:
'and among your attributes is that you act, and
i
among our attributes is that we attribute*
( i It J"*'®-’ O  ^ o y  ^
essence: .
o j u l /
'you woi/Ld like him who . . . ' ( ^ jT cu5^
'you would become like him who . . .' ( d )
Paragraph 93 joins the first two again, thus: 
act - attribution:
'and praise be to him who made . . . your act in 
accordance with your speech'
( (3-Sj d l  *-9; • * • )
From 'our speech (description)' to 'your speech', speech
per se is an issue here.
In paragraphs 96 and 97, it is with this issue of speech
as attribution that the discourse will cut off from one
subject and re-orient itself to another, namely, from act:
as 'punish-pardon1, to the verbal side of this: 'blame-
praise', and reference switches from A.W., to author and
text. This will be reference to the author's use of blame
in joking (Jahiz on A.W.'s shape) and its use with regard
2
to joking itself.
§96: 'so as for my mentioning build and shape . . .
and what separates us and you in that . . .  1 
( cl) J ^  U j uiJ 1 L t i )
j ~ ~ " '
See above: 7.1; Adad translates these three forms of
'attribute' by 'qualitds . . . characterise . . . louange*
thus erasing the visibility of the sign.
2
See below: 10.1.2 on textual layering: here, it is:
in blame on 'blame' by blame etc. ( . . . L, jj| jlA )
similar to that used with 'excess', above: 6.3.
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§97: 1(joking) . . . so if it is to be blamed . .
( "JL 0 t Uti ( . . . C I>JI) )
This is interspersed with reflections on discrepancy between 
’form' (JaiJ) and 'content' ( )  which cannot help but 
highlight the idea of irony. There is also commentary on 
'excess' and 'mistake* to be related to Jankeldvitch's 
observation that irony is 'un savoir extra-lucide et si 
m&itre de soi qu'il se rend capable de jouer avec l'erreur.1
The schema for interference of text in paragraphs 96 
and 97 could be roughly presented in this form, which shows 
text as medium in change of subject:
person:
blaming
text:
blaming
4*
blamed
person
blamed
The subject of attribution continues into §98; through^ 
ostensibly: A.W.: he appears in a list which moves from
overstatement ((no) limit: ^^) to understatement (gesture:
'is not the limit of the beautiful, description of you
dlitgj VI I <L le
'is not adornment of eloquence, praise of you
VI ^ l »I\ QzJ J-*?
'objective except you
'example other than you Ji.
'"rajaz" (metre) except in you tiLi y rj
'except by mention of you "31
w c
'glances on any but you cile 'yi
'gesture to anyone but you' tdJ
See above: 6.2.
Jankdlevitch, op. cit., p. 59.
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Thus the series ends in the silent, perfection such that 
it stills the word.
Perfection as a problem of speech, a problem for the 
describer, appears in the next paragraph, 99. As already 
mentioned (see above p. 131, note 2) I disagree with Adad's 
reading of this. I read it as further irony: the neces­
sity of keeping A.W. in mind, as model, in order not to put 
speech itself in question. In the second part of the 
paragraph, there is more hyperbole, leading to phrases that 
say, essentially, nothing.
§99: 'and what matter of yours has no limit, and what
thing from you is not the ultimate, and do you 
have in you any thing which goes beyond some­
thing, or something which goes beyond it . . .1
J  ^  ^  J f C <3-** '«-£ ?  < b  U -  d J p f )
( c ( 3 - «  I C
This ends in the meaningless statement quoted under hyperbole,
another instance of collapse in silence.
The ending of both of these paragraphs (98, 99) suggests
the attribute 'ineffable', which seems a possible reading,
considering, briefly, those suggested in the subsequent
paragraphs:
§100: immutable
§101: invisible
§10 2: incorruptible
It is obvious that these are a little far-fetched for any
mortal, let alone A.W. As Gracian writes about 'figures
par exagdration':
C'est peu que de parler du possible si on ne transcende 
pas h 1'impossible. Les autres figures disent ce que 
est, celle-ci, ce qui pourrait etre, et ne s'en contente
1 36
meme pas, puisqu’elle a 1'audace d'unir les contraires.
Expression via contraries gives one two choices: either
level of irony seems to pose this question. If one adds 
hyperbole to this, one gets the following schema:
So, as well as irony about A.W., this series of paragraphs 
involves the problem of attribution, per se, and what I have 
emphasized is that this is matched by its exposition: the
problematic of the relationship of sign to sense, showing 
up in ’rhetorical’ devices, or: syntactic subversions of
semantic values.
B. Gracian, Art et figures de l ’esprit (Paris, 1983),
p. 168.
2
See above, 'probabilism’: 1.3.
2
both contraries are valid, or one is a mistake. The double
mistake ( '
expression of 
the impossible:
hyperbole
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Chapter Eight
JOKE - III: SEMANTICS
The double level of representation depicted in the irony 
of Joke - II, an 'is' which 'is not1 possible for A.W. , puts 
'zero degree' attribution and predication in question. For 
Jahiz's reflections on the referential power of words,
Joke - III will focus on the interrelationships of certain 
recurrent words and their contexts, as well as semantic 
ambiguity and how it is blocked, keeping in mind Jolles 
comment on the Joke, '. . . l'univers de comique est un 
univers ou les choses se nouent en se ddfaisant ou en se
i
denouant‘.
8.1 Collocation
Despite disparagements of the coherence of Jahiz's
style, such as Beeston's, 'a corruscation of associated
ideas often with only the slenderest logical connection 
2
between them', there are definite patterns which emerge 
in Jahiz's use of words. To take a specific example, I 
will examine the use of the semes ‘wonder* ) and
'strange' ( — . Considering the plethora of information 
in the risala. on the marveljous in mythology and nature, it 
is interesting to note that the semes mentioned do not
occur in these contexts. Rather, this ’strange/wonder‘
1 ~ ' ~
Jolles, op. cit., p. 207 (my italics).
2
A.F.L. Beeston, op. cit., p. 2.
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pair occur almost always in the following two contexts: 
first, description of A.W., second, reference to description 
itself, or what I will refer to as text; it is only at the 
very end of the risala that there is a change of context.
8.1.1 A.W. - Wonder - Text
Enough has been said about the role of A.W. as foil:
for ‘excess' and ‘mistake1 in Joke - I, and the self-
contradictory operations of irony in Joke - II. Suffice
it to point out that in connection with the semes in guestion,
the initial focus is, invariably, A.W. In this first
example, antithetical attributes are presented, and the whole
statement is in terms of hyperbole:
§9: A.W. - ‘strange1
'and that you have the pure, and they have the
mixed; this is equal to the strange which we do
not know, and the amazing which we cannot attain'
• * c 2 1 I I ^ Ij L«fJ I dJJ
d-* [>■> wl! I j-J
In the next case, antithetical attributes (in terms of 
poetry) are joined to create an anomolous situation, deriv­
ing from use of the analogy: A.W. = poetry
§15: A.W. - 'strange* - poetic metres (text)
‘and from among the strange (things) which you 
were given and the amazing with which you are 
graced . . . you are the "extended" and you are
the "wide" . . .'
> >
*-U lS*J I .*i Is . . .  i** i ( li  ^  CaJ apI I* 1
• . ♦ l
In paragraphs 17 and 31, poetry is cited, ostensibly, again, 
to describe situations analogous to that of the 'wonder' of
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A.W.; these will be noted below, in 8.3.1 and 8.2.4 
respectively, let it merely be stated here that they are 
further collocations of: A.W. - wonder - text (poetry).
Paragraph 104 is one of the most explicit instances 
of text as mediator, through analogy, between description 
of one physical 'wonder' and another:
§104: A.W. - 'strange and wondrous': mosque -
text: Jahiz's
'"strange beauties we do not know, and wonders 
of manufacture we have not met" . . . that is a
topos stolen from me in description of you, and
taken from my books in your praise*
x f  tv s
( <-U ^  O* ^2^ ^  <,-lI J
The idea of people's wonderment is also presented in connection 
with different types of text:
§105: A.W. - text: Jahiz's - listener's 'wonder*
‘so do not wonder 0 listener . . . that I am 
excessive, for if you saw him . . .'
( <iIt 1 J J s j J u f • ♦ • £-» I )
§165: text: Jahiz's - people's 'wonder'
'and people might wonder at my verbosity'
§82: text: discourse of M . , - wonder: Jahiz's
'and I used to wonder at Muhammad ibn Abdul
Malik.. . . who never said after . . .'
( • » . JaS J j g  . il l J I wU-C- i < f i"
§204: wonder: Jahiz's - the extraordinary
‘and I used to wonder about everything that
departed from the ordinary'
( a j  L*J I ^  ^   ^ C-J^
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§204: wonder: Muhammad's - wondrous: their saying:
(contd)
(Quran: 13.5)
'and if you (Muhammad) wonder, then wondrous is 
their saying . . .‘
wonder: Muhammad's - wondrous: (God's act)
(Quran: 37.12)
'rather, you wondered and they mocked'
( 'z^rTs' <J-r)
The implications and references here will be discussed 
below: 8.4.2. Suffice it here to point out the many levels 
of text at which this collocation with 'wonder' is made.
The last two examples concern text at the level of expression, 
and of word.
§182: text: discourse - 'wonder' of 'magic'
‘as he heard a man talking about amazing, 
wondrous, delicate, subtle discourse'
( J*-5j 1— ^
§28: text: expression - 'wonder' of subtlety
‘and the most wondrous of expressions, according
to you is (that which is) subtle, and sweet and
light and easy'
w « w <1 C
( *— . JLCj ,Jj I* ti) Ju j . UJ V 1 ^ _>•_£.])
8.1.2 A.W. - Sign - Text
Another pattern that emerges in the risala is the 
collocation of 'wonder1 and text with 'sign* (J^j ),
'proof' ( ) , 'beacon' (S-T) , and 'witness' ( j L ^  ) . Again,
the first instances of this involve reference to A.W.
§17: A.W. - 'wonder' - 'beacon*
'and were there no other wonder in you but that
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you were the first whom God made to worship him 
with steadfastness despite the mistake of the 
senses . . . you would have been in your tallness 
a beacon to the wayfarer'
^Jlp j-waj L dJJt a ^  t dL'f VI I ^  j Jj  )
( i,T uJJ jl? ^ d-jj* jjJ . . • I Ux^
§13: A.W. - ‘p r o o f  and ‘witness* - text: Jahiz's
'and is there on earth any . . . clearer proof 
or more reliable witness than my witnessing to 
what you claim about yourself*
j^_ft>l.i J  cs*
As with paragraphs 17 and 31, and the use of poetic quotes 
for analogy with the ‘wonder* of A.W., paragraph 25 refers 
to-poetic quotes in paragraph 24 as ‘proofs' and 'signs* 
for A.W. These quotes will be discussed below in 8.4.1.
Finally, there are instances in which ‘sign* concerns 
text in the sense of expression and style.
§103: proof and sign - text: poetic imagery - A.W.
1 and if it were not that we cannot say . . .  in 
description of praise: "he is more handsome
than . . . "  there would be in that shining 
proof and clear sign'
y J k d.J>- JuJ J1 JlI£■ . . . ^■i* llCfaUiw V G t  VI
( oljl JJjJ!, jt)l 0 UjJl dJJ o*
§116: sign - text: discourse of joking
‘and of the merits of joking is that it is a 
sign to well-being'
( Jb>Jt ^ J  ^JiLai 0 *2)
This last use of 'sign' occurs in a paragraph in which
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'joking' is treated in terms of the Case, with the conco­
mitant vocabulary of 'defender', 'preferer', etc.; in other 
words, it resembles personification, a type of metaphorical 
language. Though there may seem little metaphor in the 
risala if it is understood in terms of rhetoric as 'a trope
i
. . . a deviation', there is constant analogy, using the
mechanics of what Ricoeur calls 'semantic' metaphor, ‘a
phenomenon of predication, an unusual attribution precisely
o
at the sentence-level of discourse'.
The question here is to what extent the mechanics of 
language encourage this, and to what extent Jahiz takes 
advantage of it. The slides of reference noted in connection 
with the words 'wonder/strange' and 'sign' involve text, 
and its expressive mechanism. In the introduction, with 
re'spect to reference and identity, the question was posed 
as to how one arrives at definitions in a text like this, 
and it was posited that assuming an authorial point of view
3
constitutes a reduction of possibilities. Furthermore, within 
the thesis, I have insisted on expansion by the polysemy of 
textual layering and the synonymy of cumulative citation.
4
Here, I intend to consider briefly (1) single instances 
of signification in which word as ontological referent is 
put in question, and (2) what methods Jahiz uses to stabilize 
such semic wandering.
P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor (London, 1978), p. 44.
2 Ibid.
3
See above; 0.1.3.
4
All examples here (with the exception of §21) are from 
paragraphs cited in connection with the 'wonder' or 'sign' 
collocation, viz. ^§9/15/17/31/104/105/165/82/204/182/28/13/ 
25/24/103/116/205/207.
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8.2 Identity
8.2.1 Essence
The nature of a thing in itself, whether it is a whole 
or a sum of parts, is posed in the Damascenes1 questions 
on the 'wonder1 of their mosque:
§104: reference - whole/part
'we do not know whether the essences of its 
parts are nobler as essences, or whether it is 
the composition of its pieces as compositions 
of pieces'
.’At. > ^  ^ L-^ JaS^  j.A (_!_» )
( c \jj>- VI eJ Ju .h£lZ  ^
8.2.2 Antonymy
Whether a thing itself can simultaneously contain anti­
thetical attributes is a question posed after analogy has 
been drawn between A.W. and poetry:
§15: reference - antithetical attributes
'so what poetry, to be able to combine all the 
* O !
metres, and what individual, to be able to com- 
a
bine roundness and tallness'
( JjJaJ Ij dj I lTLlv V 1 £**j>- Lj  ^ ^  )
8.2.3 Synonymy
Synonymy operates at various levels, from definitions 
such as that cited below, to the associations of implicit 
analogy made through citation of quotes, to be discussed 
below: 8.4.1 .
§13: reference - referent plus
‘know that envy is the name of that which sur­
passes competition'
4  £
( Lif I I
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8.2.4 Polysemy
The question of semic constancy of a word in different 
contexts arises often, and in the following case involves 
the transformation of fault to virtue by analogical transfer: 
§31: reference - referent transformed
’and there is no fault in her other than the
yellow of her eye; thus it is with mature birds
who are yellow of eye*
(  ^  ^ dl! p n 15*.* L^s )
8.3 Mistake
8.3.1 Via language
This ambiguity of the seme is inherent in language;
context change may even require change of word, as is evident
in'the quote Jahiz uses in connection with truth and the
outward appearance of A.W.:
§17: reference - referent denied
’she got fat and her calves changed, her fatness
was not fatness, and her hump was not a hump’ v
( I ^  I V c..;« )
Granted this referential inadequacy, one bridges the gap
by reference to something else; this is the conscious choice
2
of style, or, as Genette would say, the ’motivated’ sign.
8.3.2 Via style
In the same paragraph, there is an instance of this 
choice in simple comparison to a known image:
§17: reference - referent renamed:
’her limbs got thin at the middle of her belly,
-
See above: 7.2.
2 Ibid.
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a hump like the tiled castle of al-Hajiri'
Iyl ^3 J  t  )
What is interesting is that not only does Jahiz highlight 
the problem of mistake of word and reference here, but the 
quotes are used between two references to 'mistake1; of 
the eyes, and of the senses or, a further problem, that of 
epistemological reference.
8.4. Context
8.4.1 Endoxy
In the 'figure' comparison, the choices are usually 
through reference to the 'known', the pool of endoxy whether 
it be by proper noun or by stock image. Thus, when A.W.
compares himself, it is to a long list of personages:
§21: reference - referent by name:
'and. those who resemble you in shortness are
many . . . and I have often seen you justify
yourself by citing . . . (list of proper names)'
On the other hand, when Jahiz himself posits the problem 
of comparing A.W., he cites a long list of (by now?) stock 
images:
§103: reference - referent by picture
’. . . he is handsomer than the moon . . .  as
if his neck were a silver ewer . . .'
( cua* j-; I diLie (jfc* . . . I ^  jJb )
The question of whether these are stock images, clichds, is 
not unimportant, because if they are clichds, they are a
powerful blocking mechanism to semic wandering; they cannot 
-
This list of proper names is so convincing that designation 
acts on attribution: so for those persons historically
unidentified (i.e. Aufa ibn Zurara) Pellat's identification 
is 'il ressort du texte qu'il dtait de petite taille' index, 
p. 6, and see above: 4.3.1.
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be changed by context. As Riffaterre writes,
alors que pour tout procddd de style, la valeur et 
le sens sont entierement determines par le contexte, 
le clichd est exceptionnel en ceci que sa structure 
le predestine & certaines fonctions quel que soit le 
contexte ou il parait.l
In this connection, one might ask just how standard 
are the images cited in serial analogy, i.e. the phenomenon 
of multiple quotes centred around a keyword? An example may 
be taken from those in §24 cited in paragraph 25 as ‘clear 
proofs’ for A.W. (1>--2>^ J1 ) :
§24: in the 'case1 for 'wide':
four 'poetic' quotes:
'as if the land of God, though it is wide, were 
a hunter's snare to the fearful wanted man'
( J- L>- I -JLjU-Jl aJx,jS. JlSI
'and in the wide world there is a way for man1
( * -ft uU d - 1 I  jJJ  ^ * * • )
'do not you two envy me, may God bless you, on 
this earth with all its width to make room for 
m e '
( LJ L*_«y; 1 IJ VI Uli dll t id, L I juv-j-j ^)
‘we traverse the earth and we encounter the earth, 
surely the country has overwhelmed us with width'
( V.kp^ c IuLaIp a 1 I )
Thus, the word 'wide' has made its 'case' in its different 
forms, as adjective, noun and adverb. All these attempts 
to define the attribute 'wide' with reference to A.W. have 
involved another semantic focus (and synonymic associations), 
that of the world, and its status as asylum. This is under­
lined by the last 'proof', the Quranic quote (57.21):
- .
Riffaterre, Essais de Stylistique Structurale (Paris,
1971), p. 181.
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1 and a garden whose width is like the width of 
the heavens and the earth'
c J* w
This is ultimate width and ultimate asylum. No matter how 
flat the reference, or standard the image, by serialization 
in quotes there is almost always semantic expansion. Para­
doxically, situation in a quote, in a 'known' image, also 
acts as semantic stabilization.
8.4.2 Orthodoxy
Thus, it is in citation of text that semic wandering 
is most particularly fixed, and Jahiz gives examples of this 
in connection with further Quranic quotes; another way in
i
which orthodoxy defines itself is through specification 
of allusion. In both of the paragraphs to be cited there 
is an example of potential semic wandering, and an example 
of semic stabilization by context.
In paragraph 182, semic wandering is represented in 
Jahiz's choices for how a word may be understood:
§182: reference - polysemy:
‘and people said, "surely he is uglier than 
magic" when they meant the same topos to which 
it is compared, and the topos attributed to it, 
and magic itself'
4.j A* ni«J I I J 1 I wl | I  ^  ^ J  ^
{ 4 +*JLi ^ y > r J j I P I
Just before this, however, he gives an instance in which 
vague reference is made precise by its contextualization as 
synonym in a series:
For another version of definition, see above: 6.3.2.
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§182: reference - synonymy:
'and God has mentioned sorcerers in the Quran 
and informed about Harut and Marut and reported 
on the "spitters on knots'" (113.4)
I C u* .
O * ^  o ' j J j  )
( * ajL*ji ^  ^biLjr 
In paragraph 204, there is an instance of possible semic
wandering through multiple uses of the same word, and Jahiz's 
explicit reflection on this. Then he proposes two ways in 
which this might be blocked: first, by syntactic manipulation 
of language, second, by concurrent contextualization in sacred 
text.
§204: reference - wandering
'I used to wonder . . . wondrous . . . .  wonderful 
. . . wondrous . . .'
Jahiz's comment:
'by the entry of all of them (extraordinary things) 
into the category of the wonderful, they all leave 
the category of the wondrous'
( 1 u  L ^  c i — 1 c- L ^  a-i)
reference - fixed by opposition: (and context)
'"rather you wondered, and they mocked"' (37.12)
„ o f S n
( '^isTs' J-? )
reference - fixed by context:
'"and if you (Muhammad) wonder, then wondrous is 
their saying"' (13.5)
This is a very laconic reference, but the combination of 
these two Quranic allusions rounds out the implications of
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the word ‘wonder’; this is based on their contexts.
The contexts of these two Quranic citations are the 
following:
The rest of verse 5, 'their saying* is:
'when we were dust we would surely be in a new creation'
( jl L t j | • * • )
The part of verse 11 directly preceding 12 is:
'we created them from firm clay' ( O* t-’l)
Thus, identification of 'wonder' is: creation of man from
clay, and re-creation from dust.
From the point of view of subsequent Islamic literature, 
it is interesting to see how fixed the definition remains.
There seem to be two ways in which this seme can be regarded:
as wonder in the world through God's creation, and as historic 
vindication of Islam and the Arabs' mission. The first can 
be seen in Mohammad Arkoun's comment, 'le merveilleux 
litt^raire . . . se nourrit des examples nombreux par lequels 
le Coran cherche a exciter 1'dmerveillement (cajab) de 
l'homme devant les merveilles de la crdation'. The second 
emerges from Andrd Miquel's analysis of a tale from the 
thousand and one nights; 'Mais le vrai merveilleux, c'est 
le miracle que Gharib realise et sur sa destinde et sur 
celle du monde . . .  a cette histoire d'arabes triomphants 
. . . car le merveilleux, c'est que cette histoire ait 
existd.1^
There is, thus, transition from 'wonder/strange’ as
description of the physical reality of A.W. to that of God's
-
M. Arkoun, ‘Peut-on Parler de Merveilleux dans le Coran?', 
L'Etrange et le Merveilleux dans L'Islam Mddidval (Paris,
1978), p. 2.
2
A. Miquel, Un Conte des Mille et Une Nuits; Ajib et 
Gharib (Paris, 1977), p. 290.
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creation. Included is the wonder of text itself as sign,
and of language which allows expression of such 'wonders'.
Without specific textual grounding, words can continue to
-]
float in what I have called partial reference. Jahiz has
used both mechanisms in the risala. and the next instances 
of 'wonder/strange' at the end of the risala seem, in 
counterpoint to the Quranic quotes, purposely ambiguous.
§205: 'and know that there remains no more of a devas­
tating wonderer than the share of the tongue, and 
no more of a devastating listener but the portion 
of hearing1
0 * ^ 3  0 b«JJ I 1 lib UJ1 1 ^  dJ ^ ^^3 )
( 1 d u M l  liblaJl -j," 11
§20Jd : 'so the correct today is strange, and its master 
is unknown, and the wonder is among those who are 
correct though obscure, and speak though forbidden
'so if you have been just, so you have done the
strange thing' ^  ^U)
For this reason, I detect an irony in the over-specification
of Adad's translation for the first part of the second quote
‘La raison de nos jours, est quelque chose de
2proscrit (I ? - . '
In Joke - I, I analysed Jahiz's use of a word in differ
ent contexts, the plays of polysemy. In Joke - II, on the
other hand, I examined the problem of differing contexts, 
creations of polysemy (or a-semy) by textual manipulation.
1
See above: 3.5.2.
2
Adad, op. cit., p. 319.
152
Finally, in Joke - III, it emerges that if it is this pos­
sibility of polysemy, of ambiguity, in words, which is 
necessary to attribution and predication, at some point that 
ambiguity must be blocked. This is the function of context: 
of text, serial texts, and most particularly, a sacred text.
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Chapter Nine
LITERARY TYPOLOGIES
So far, I have taken each of Jahiz's registers of dis­
course, whether insistent questioning (the Riddle) accumulation 
of citations (Memorabilia), argument and speculation (the 
Case), or ironic address (the Joke), as exemplifications 
of one of Jolles' ‘Formes Simples'. As this may appear to 
be tacit agreement with Pellat and others that there is some 
difficulty in conceiving of the risala as a coherent whole,
I would now like to identify various literary typologies 
to see if the risala fits any of these patterns, and will 
mention, by chapter, those discourse registers most closely 
implicated.
I will, thus, consider the risala in terms of three 
typologies, based on aspects isolated by Pellat and Adad. 
Because of the controversy which Pellat sees as its base,
I will discuss it first in terms of presentation of 'fact' 
(Rhetoric); because of the question of occasion and recipient, 
I will then discuss it in terms of fiction ('Histoire'), 
and because of the question of idiosyncracy of style, I will, 
finally, discuss it in terms of non-fact, non-fiction 
(Mannerism). In each section, I will rely on commentary 
by one critic, and occasional comparison with homologous 
models.
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9.1 Fact
9.1,1 'Enonce*vs.^Enonciation1
The problem with this text as argumentation is the 
assumption that it is a personal and idiosyncratic statement 
of a more general argument, in defence of Islam, or some 
contemporary form of it. The issue thus becomes similar to 
that of figurative versus literal speech, metaphorical versus 
'common*usage: viz. the first 'common' form of statement
onto which Jahiz has appended his idiosyncratic style. It 
is the opposition o-P what the French call ' l'enonce' and 
'1'dnonciation', and can be seen in the terms of opposition 
associated with rhetoric and its decline:
i
Barthes: 'Evidence1 vs. 'langage'
2
Foucault: 'pensde' vs. 'parole'
3
" 'discours vrai' vs. ‘discours faux'
By these standards, anything explicitly persuasive, blatantly 
'literary', and identifiably 'transportable' is to be shunned
4
by pure thought in search of itself and its 'factual' bases.
There has been, however, modern re-appraisal of the 
validity of these oppositions and as a practising jurist, 
Charles Perelman has written on the indissolubility of argu­
mentation and language in terms which enable one in turn 
to compare the risala with rhetoric. The resemblances are 
many and obvious, so here I will merely isolate those points 
of particular relevance to the discourse registers analysed,
and summarize them under the headings: (1) witness,
-
R. Barthes, 'L'Ancienne Rhdtorique', Communications 
(Paris, 1970), p. 192.
2
M. Foucault, L'Ordre du Discours (Paris, 1971), p. 74.
3 Ibid.
4
G. Genette, Figures II (Paris, 1969), p. 40.
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(2) statement, and (3) rhetor.
9.1.2 Witness
Witness figures as premise, apud Perelman: what is
thought to have been experienced and already generally
1
accepted as authoritive. As isolated in the discourse
registers, this is:
communal experience: the Riddle - Perelman: ‘experience
. 2commune'
3
dlite wisdom: Memorabilia- Perelman: 'hierarchie'
world as it is: Case I - Perelman: ’ce qui se
4
produit normalement1
5
9.1.3 Statement
No matter how authoritative the witness, Perelman's 
main point is that argumentation's real basis is in the
g
'elaboration d'un langage adequat'. Precedent is based 
on enumerations and associations of elements, as 'la choix
Q
de certains elements leur donne une presence' . Analogies 
are imaginative as well as argumentative, 'elles servent 
tantot a structurer une rdalitd inconnue tantot a prendre
9
position a son egard.' Thus, one sees in the risala:
Case II: 'presence' in syntagm
Case III: 'structure' in analogy
___
Ch. Perelman, L'Empire Rhetorique (Paris, 1977), p. 36.
 ^ Ibid., p . 38.
 ^ Ibid., p . 39.
 ^ Ibid., p . 38.
5
Witness and statement have already been mentioned in 
Aristotelian terms: 'preuves hors technique', and 'preuves
techniques' respectively, see above: 6.1.2, 6.1.3.
6 Perelman, op. cit., p. 22.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid., p . 49.
 ^ Ibid., p . 66.
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9.1.4 Rhetor
In rhetoric, of course, the motivating force is con­
troversy, and the speaking voice is partisan. The exercise 
lies in transformation of the partisan into the norm, and 
here there is a very delicate balance to be kept by the 
rhetor. He may adduce authority (the 'witness* already 
mentioned) with no reluctance to name it as such, viz. Jahiz*s 
1 and the saying o f ' { )
'and he (the poet) said' ( JlSj)
He may explicitly present his text not only as party to, 
but as silencer of, dispute:
§11: 1. . . and when you know that, you will be
delivered from us as we hope to be delivered 
from you*
He may also, through coincidence of 'dnonciation1 and 'enoncd' 
admit his own complicity in the case in the following terms:
(described.facts
Y's argument speaker 
language
< \
= case X = (describer : >  Joke I
< /
(description'
9.1.5 Subversion
As accuser, he may make it very clear that the defender 
is not the site of norm:
A.W. is 'excessive' Joke I- 'text is excessive'
A.W. is 'blamed* Joke II; text is 'blamed'
However, the syllepsis that is apparent above (A.W.:text) 
puts authorial voice in question also. Added to this are 
tacit admissions of authorial
'surpassing* Joke I
'mistake' "
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Not only does Jahiz undermine the authorial voice (Joke I), 
but also syntax (Joke II) and sign (Joke III). By language, 
then, the focus of norm is confused, and this subversion 
of authorial voice taints the risala as argumentation. The 
1enonciation' puts in question the 1enonce'.
9.2 Fiction
9.2.1 Representation vs. Narration
In this typology, the oppositions lie in representation
and narration, paradigm and syntagm, or what K. Stierle calls
'example' and 'histoire'. The French word 'histoire' is
nicely ambiguous. Thus, A.W. may be a person with an identity
in history (i.e. a defender in a rhetorical battle) or a
fictional character whose story is being told. These are
both figures of anecdote, of that particularity of experience
which Stierle sees as catalyst in development of fiction,
from the univocity of 'exemple' to the equivocity of
'histoire'. Since A.W. has been taken seriously as 
2
individual, I intend briefly to examine the elements emerging 
in the first paragraphs, 1 to 14, which constitute: (1) his
persona,(2) his world, and (3) his society.
9.2.2 Persona
Though paragraphs 1 to 3 deal with the rhetoric of claim 
and counter-claim, these claims concern that first, basic, 
fictional motif, the physical looks and age of the protag­
onist. The opposition of 'reality* and fiction is immediately 
introduced/ as Jahiz prefaces his epithets on A.W. with the 
verb ‘to be' (o^") A.W. on himself with the verb 'to
K. Stierle, op. cit., p 187. 
See above: 6.1.1.
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claim' (ly5"-1') . In other words, it is a fiction about a 
fiction.
9.2.3 The World
As amply demonstrated in previous chapters, the persona
of A.W. is one of aberration, of excess in physique and in
beliefs. Furthermore, the ancient idea that law (norm) has
1
its foundation, not merely in convention, but in Nature, 
means that Nature itself is disturbed by such aberration. 
A.W. is presented as abnormal, so the space he creates 
around himself must also be abnormal. Thus, in these first 
paragraphs, there exists a situation of imbalance of which 
A.W. is the centre.
§10; unbalanced emotions:
'and what is this envy which grieves you.'
* e
(cJjf-1 jl—j>-J\ \ Jm> Uj)
inappropriate actions:
1 and have you seen a worse deal and a weaker 
power than one who runs a thoroughbred with a 
half breed'
( J  1 ^  ! Jj h_*J I y * *  ly ji (J-A j 1 V j d ih i  CU- \j )
upside-down situation:
'and have you exaggerated . . . and created
renown for the obscure'
❖ > t / c
(  ^ J* d* Lww )
9.2.4 Others
Though these descriptions are absurd in their extremes, 
they present two of the basic elements of ‘fiction, man and 
his situation. The third element, a necessary dynamic in
- 1 .------<v--------------------- :-------------------------------
Ciceron, Des Lois (Paris, 1965), p. 136.
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the creation of story, is the encounter with others. This 
is present in the risala from its inception. First, in 
paragraph 4, Jahiz reveals that his stand also represents 
that of others:
§4: 'when our patience began to wear1
( L jL L * l  JU= UJ)
and that he will present evidence to the largest possible 
society:
‘to the settled and the nomadic1 ( j  j U  lj ^ oUdJ)
Second, this is considerably reinforced in paragraph 14, 
which introduces the opinions of others on A.W.:
§14: 'and they had known . . . that you have, along
with length of thigh when mounted, length of 
back when sitting1
{ L J U -  1 j  LJ ! J d J  J  • • . uSj  )
Furthermore, this is given greater dramatic possibilities 
by including direct speech of A.W. rejecting the view of 
society:
'and what do I care if people see me as wide as, in 
God's eyes, I am tall and handsome'
(  ^l-l-lp L’ ... 1 1_J I \ j- s i )
However, A.W. is never anything but ’wide'; the ques­
tion is not one of anecdote and individual transformation, 
but of the space between extremes. Excess in persona leads 
to aberration in the world, and to contention with others. 
This is a clear scheme of anti-1imitatio', of exemplum 
reversed.
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9.2.5 Polarization
1
As pointed out in Joke II, through irony there is con­
currence of negative and positive, of identity and difference. 
The first aspect of this is obverse representations. If 
one were to take the concept of ‘imitatio’ by identity in
2
Stierle's 'exemple', and by analogy in Auerbach's 'figura* 
and add the reversals effected by irony, one would get the 
following concurrent representations in the risala:
irony 'exemple‘ 'figura'
(reversal) (identity) (analogy)
negative ->- marvel: of A.W. width: of A.W.
positive + marvel: God's attibute: God's
creation space
The second aspect of the concurrence of postive-negative 
in ironic exemplum is that such non-individualized represent­
ation, most particularly representation through the grotesque 
attribute ('wide'), is an opening to relationships within 
the cosmos, and polarities of experience lost in later 
Realist literature. This is a point made by M. Bakhtine 
in his consideration of Rabelais and forms of the proto-
3
novel. Fiction here is constituted by extension in space, 
not change in time.
Thus, just as persuasion by rhetoric was subverted in 
the excesses of authorial voice, so the individual experience 
of 'histoire' is subverted in the polarizations of irony.
_
See above: 7.5.
2
E, Auerbach, Mimesis (Princeton, 1974), p. 49.
3
M. Bakhtine, L'Oeuvre de Frangois Rabelais (Paris, 1970), 
p. 319.
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9.3 Non-Fact - Non-Fiction
9.3.1 1 Represente1 and 'Representation1
There is a literary typology which accommodates the 
arguing voice and its self-derision, as well as the persona 
and his exemplification. It is a typology of layerings and 
concurrences, the coincidence of 'represent^' and 
'representation*. Its features are not dissimilar from 
those in the risala/ and there are Greek, baroque, and con­
temporary models to which I will briefly refer. I will call 
it Mannerist, and rather than try to duplicate the elegant
i
definition of the genre given by Stefan Sperl, I would like 
to examine what I consider its dynamic principles:
(1) excess, (2) dislocation, and (3) ambiguity.
9.3.2 Excess
(a) plethora
Excess occurs in two ways, in the multiplication of 
things stated, and the multiplicity of levels from which 
these are viewed. Joke - I deals with the theme of 'excess', 
symbolized from the start in exaggeration of physical 
attributes. The Riddle deals with the plethora of questions 
and subjects. These two elements are similar to Rabelais' 
presentation of Gargantuan body and Pantagruelic erudition, 
and are also found in the exhaustive references in Tristram 
Shandy.
(b) reference
The question of reference by citation has been mentioned 
in Memorabilia and Rhetoric in terms of legitimization, and 
in Joke - III in terms of semic expansion and textual blocking.
_  .
S. Sperl, 'Mannerism in Arabic Literature', Ph.D. thesis 
(University of London, 1977), pp. 261-76.
\
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In the Mannerist model, its legitimizing role is self­
consciously displayed in layerings, in which the written 
authenticates the lived. An example is in this passage from 
Lucian's ’Icaromenippus', 'but as Homer says somewhere or 
other - having seen what was there, I suppose, just like 
me - "the Gods themselves" . . .‘ This can be schematized
as follows:
implicit: reality fiction reality
Homer says +■ Homer saw
I saw I say
(quote of 
--- Homer)
written lived written
explicit: fiction reality fiction
In a similar way, the risala mixes the speech of 'he' and the 
speech of Jahiz, the witness of one with the witness of the 
other.
Furthermore, in the Mannerist style, the inside projec­
tion of reality by reference (source in text) is often as 
reliable as its outside projection (text as source). Not 
only does Pellat have trouble locating information outside 
Jahiz's own literary universe, Lucian's translator writes 
in a note, 'These events, in so far as they are historical,
are not synchronous. For some of them . . . Lucian is our
2
only sponsor.' Of course, Rabelais and Lawrence Sterne 
are celebrated for their extravagant lists, which usually 
start with the known and, through analogy, create mythical 
universes. That Jahiz can be suspected of doing the same
Lucian, II (London, 1968), p. 315.
A.M. Harmon, trans. Lucian, op. cit., note 1, p. 295.
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thing has been discussed in the Riddle, and in contemporary 
American literature the willed confusions of fact and fiction 
in text as source have engendered a style called 'faction'.
(c) reflection
In addition to plethora in subjects and multiple layers 
of reference, excess, in the Mannerist style, exists on 
another level, that of reflections on the text. First, it 
takes the form of direct and indirect discourse within the 
text, beginning with a multiplicity of voices. In the risala, 
this can be observed within the discourse registers. For 
example, in Memorabilia, there is overlapping; the voice 
of 'he' is: (1) the voice of the poet, (2) the voice of
the man of action (3.2), (3) the voice of the man of
reflection (3.3).
Second, these voices are also set in opposition to each 
other, as in the 'I-you' voices: in Jahiz's questions (I)
and A.W.'s answers (You), presenting the 'dnigmes et 
plaidoyers' that Bakhtine cites as typical of the proto- 
novel and that I have isolated as the different discourse 
registers of Riddle and Case.
Finally, in the autocriticism of the Joke is to be found 
the specific indirect discourse on direct discourse which 
is one of the constituents of Bakhtine's 'plurilinguisme‘, 
and at the base of the proto-novel.
9.3.3 Dislocation
(a) contiguity: presence
Thus, from the 'excesses' of the protagonist, to a world 
of excesses: of sources and discourses, as commentary and
M. Bakhtine, Esthdtique et Theorie du Roman (Paris, 1978), 
p. 415.
2 Ibid., p. 410.
*
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reflection on eath other, the question is, how is it ordered? 
Lack of distinct subordination in Jahiz*s text has been com­
mented on in Joke - II, and there are at least two ways of 
regarding these dislocations. The first is to find in stark 
juxtaposition a signalling of things, Perelman*s 'moyen de 
crder une presence'. As observed in Case - II, floating 
elements, or enumerations and repetitions can be used for 
their own sake, for constitution of the syntagmatic list.
(b) contiguity: absence
The other point of view on dislocation is one which 
misses the whole presumed to contain the parts. That this 
is a common attitude vis-a-vis the risala has been amply 
discussed, but it is an attitude taken also vis-a-vis 
baroque and contemporary literature. Having chosen metonymy 
as one of the organizing principles of modern literature, 
David Lodge is forced into this hierarchical problem which,
I think, might have been avoided had he chosen the larger 
syntagmatic principle: contiguity. He phrases the problem
this way: ’A more radical way of denying the obligation
to select is to exhaust all the possible combinations in 
1
a given field1. (Here, the field is Beckett on shoes and
socks; a similar exhaustiveness, on shoes, occurs in Tristram
Shandy, p. 425.) This means that without the whole with
which to relate the parts, Lodge is led to blame presentation
of an absurd list on the concept of an absurd world. 'When
reduced to only two variables (shoes and socks), permutation
becomes simply alternation and expresses the hopelessness
2of the human situation.'
-  ,
D. Lodge, The Modes of Modern Writing (London, 1979), 
p . 230.
 ^ Ibid., p. 231.
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(c) interruption
Another aspect of dislocation is related to the levels
of that direct and indirect discourse already noted under
‘excess1. It is interruption by authorial commentary. In 
a Mannerist text, one is not merely assailed by abrupt dis­
junctions and endless enumerations, but one is usually also 
being told about this. Joke - I cites Jahiz's interjections 
on his interjections: his joking passages on his joking
passages, and Tristram Shandy abounds in such commentary;
i
viz. his digression on 'digression'.
(d) space
The problem is not that the parts do not find their 
place in a whole, it is, rather, that the subsumed whole is 
organized according to different principles from those of 
traditional argumentation, or narrative fiction. The prin- 
ciples are spatial, not logical or temporal. These are 
the relationships by contiguity or resemblance already 
mentioned in Case - III. They are those of a mental space; 
as in the mind, so in the text, one tends to forget that,
3
'tout est ici et maintenant'. Moreover, it is not certain 
how associations work in the mind. With regard to contiguity, 
this subject was introduced in the problem in Case II, and 
is wryly commented on by Sterne in his example of Trim's 
inability to recite the Fifth Commandment unless allowed
4
to begin at the First.
This mnemonic mechanism is not merely a means of
"i
L. Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
(London, 1981), pp. 94-5.
2
T. Todorov and 0. Ducrot, Dictionnaire Encyclopddique 
des Sciences du Langage (Paris, 1972), p. 377.
3
G. Genette, Figures I (Paris, 1966), p. 84.
4
Sterne, op. cit., p. 384.
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1
recovering material, it is also one of semic expansion.
In transitions by citation, it is a syntactic ploy by which
either the word in a text, or the idea conveyed by a phrase
2
is duplicated by reference and transformed in dimension 
by the 'outside' material. Thus, taking again one of Lucian's
3
uses of Homer, one gets the following schema:
syntagm Lucian: 11 shook myself and
flew upward
(Homer) "unto the palace of
•f ; Zeus, to the home
of Lucian of the other
immortals"
Lucian: Before I had gone
Lucian •
paradigmatic 
extension 
via Homer
9.3.4 Ambiguity
(a) confusion
In Mannerism, what allows this traffic between contexts, 
the word to exist in the mind in all of its semic possibilities, 
is reliance on the basic ambiguity of the word, the sign^ 
as arbitrary. Words are fixed by context, but if the con­
texts are 'spatial' ones, synchronic ones, not contexts of 
reductive logic, like that of rhetorical argumentation, nor 
contexts of development, like those of narrative fiction, 
some confusion is inevitable. As Sterne writes about Uncle 
Toby's 'confusion', 'What it did arise from . . . that is
the unsteady uses of words which have perplexed the clearest 
and most exhalted understandings . . . 'Twas not by ideas -
by heaven! his life was put in jeopardy by words!
1 1
For instances in the risala of semic expansion by citation,
see above: 3.2.2 and 8.4.1. .
2 nSee J. Wansbrough on 1gezerah sahwah1, Quranic Studies
(London, 1977), p. 167. A
3 Lucian, op. cit., p. 301.
4
Sterne, op. cit., p. 108.
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(b) suspension
This confusion may arise from cases of semic suspension 
Thus, there may be a hovering between semic possibilities 
of the kind discussed in the Riddle, in connection with 
Jahiz's use of 'collapses', when either the word or context 
does not provide semic clarity. Then there is the kind of 
suspension between poles, which allows ambiguity to stand, 
per se, in positive affirmation of both 'the tali' and 'the 
wide*. Finally, in the space of resemblance, there is the 
semic suspension which precedes the leaps made in comparison 
metaphor, and analogy.
(c) relation
On the one hand, in analogy, a leap is made between 
one context and another, and ambiguity vanishes if the 
relation between these contexts is understood. Thus, as 
discussed in Case - I and Case - II, many of Jahiz's 
analogies are based on the 'first' context of observable 
evidence (the course of a stream, the number of fingers, 
etc.). On the other hand, analogy aims at extension, at 
introduction of extra-textual material, and this can be 
another manifestation of Bakhtine's 'plurilinguisme'. That 
a particular comparison can be made assumes another point 
of view, with all the ambiguity that entails.
(d) surplus
Furthermore, Mannerism often plays on the shock of the
otherness of the added context, and refuses an apparent,
straightforward subordination; then the problem is one of
1
semic overadequacy. It may be for this reason that some 
critics have missed Jahiz's irony in the risala; there must
See above: 7.3.2.
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be some recognition of interdependence of discourse registers 
in order to grasp the density of the risala. Irony is 
nothing if not a layering of understandings.
(e) repetition
Inversely, one may have multiple contexts which may 
or may not, themselves, be the same; repetitions of material 
which seem strangely alike, a device particularly evident 
in the novels and films of Robbe-Grillet. Thus, Jahiz 
presents and re-presents a limited quantity of elements.
In the appearance and reapearance of the word 'excess', for 
instance, its semic value is changed by the different con­
texts in which it appears. But these contexts are also 
confused by sharing a similar seme.
9.3.5 'Hellenisation' — » Islamisation
In the discourse registers of the Joke, contexts seem 
to overload words so that the linguistic inadequacy in the 
Riddle seems to be matched by one of overadequacy in the 
Joke. The leap from context to context looks like one into 
excess, perhaps even into mistake, into some other voice, 
or language. When Bakhtine writes that the proto-novel 
emerges as a direct speech (Vepresente1) being commented on
-J
by an indirect speech (representation1) , he adds that this
is only possible in a cosmopolitan milieu,
car on ne peut objectiver son propre langage avec sa 
forme interne, sa vision du monde originale, son 
habitus linguistique spdcifique, q u 'h la lumi£re d 'un 
langage autre, etr^nger mais presque aussi 'sien* que 
son langage propre . . . L'hellenisme crda pour tous
les peuples barbares que lui etaient rattachds une 
puissante instance de langues dtrangeres qui fut fatale 
aux formes directes nationales du discours litfdraire.^ 
 &_________________________________________________________
Bakhtine, iop, cit., p. 409. 
2 Ibid., p. 419.
2 Ibid., p . 4 20.
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With reference to the risala, how many languages, how 
many contexts are being presented here; does their plethora 
put the 'first' meanings of words in question; does the 
confrontation of one paradigm with many lead to a new 
paradigm? Is there a new awareness of words which arises 
in the suspension between contexts, in the breaking up or 
subversion of the known syntagm? I think this is the only 
valid way of asking how idiosyncratic Jahiz's style is.
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Conclusion
SIGNIFICATION
10.1 Reference - Identity
In conclusion, I would like to propose a schema for 
the production of signification inside the text. Why I have 
analysed the risala by treating what I consider distinct 
registers of discourse has been explained, I hope, by situ­
ating it in the literary typology of Mannerism, in which 
different elements are purposely isolated to enhance their 
visibility. As noted in Chapter Nine, the irony would be 
that I might then seem to deny any interdependence of these 
discourses, and thus end up agreeing with Pellat that Jahiz's 
style is 1coq a 1'dne' .
I do not. I feel that the problem of reference and 
multiple discourse referred to in the introductory chapter 
is a problem of identity in terms of language: of signif­
ication and expression. I would, thus, like to conclude 
by looking, very briefly, at the following elements:
(1) antithesis, {2) polysemy, (3) synonymy, as they operate 
in the total risala, and as they create interdependencies 
of discourse and signification, via the axes of the para­
digmatic and the syntagmatic.
Pellat, of), cit., p. VII, on Jahiz* s reputation of inco­
herence is perhaps due in part to copyists.
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10.1.1 Antithesis
What one first notices in the risala (as discussed in 
Case - I) is the prevalence of antitheses on every topic. 
If these are associated with the various genres previously 
set out under literary typologies, one gets the following 
schema, in chart I:
CHART I
INCOHERENCE
GENRES ISSUES ANTITHESES
Rhetoric Polemic You v s . me
* Historic' Attribute Tall vs. wide
Mannerism Essence To be vs. * To b e '
10.1.2 Polysemy
(a) association
The reader is shunted back and forth within the anti­
theses, and between their readings on several levels, so 
that there is an expansion of possible significations. This 
is due to polysemy, and it operates to foster associations 
within the text, and outside it. Taking an example from 
paragraphs 30 to 33, one finds the following antitheses, 
in Chart II.
There is the usual double level inside the text here, 
namely, A.W. as topic, or theissue, per s e , as topic. The
issue per se, of course, relates to discussions outside
AN
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1
the text; in this particular case, one can move from reflec-
2tions on Wolf son’s ’attribute' (<***o ) to Wansbrough's
3
'polemic'. The mechanism is a form of polysemy called 
syllepsis, in which movement can be made from the most con­
crete understandings of a word to its most abstract.
(b) 'Aufhebung1
Inside the text, it is this sylleptic association of 
such sectarian issues with the ludicrous persona of A.W. 
as controversial subject, which allows subversion of meaning, 
with the collapses and reversals of irony, a simultaneous 
association ( ) and disassociation ( ) of signification
4
which could be called ‘Aufhebung’. Every element seems to
be presented in all seriousness in some discourse, only to 
be put in question in another, tying the discourses together 
with multiple dependencies, as seen, for instance, in 
Chart III (below, p. 174).
10.1.3 Synonymy
(a) association
This sylleptic layering of the text and its simultaneous 
subversions could easily disorient the reader but for the 
fact that meaning nevertheless accumulates by related syntagms,
5
by the constitution of a ’picture’ through synonymies:
_
This (the paradigmatic) is the area I have purposely ignored 
in the thesis, insisting that amply primary signification 
exists within the text. I refer to it only in passing, now, 
as an area of subsequent interest, once internal textual 
dynamics have been considered.
2
H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (London, 1976), 
p. 19.
3
J. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu (Oxford, 1978), 
p. 40.
4
See M. Seidler, ’Franz Kafka - ein Vortrag', in Die 
Padagogischey Proving: 6 (1 962), pp. 299-31 2, esp. 306-8.
 ^ See above: 4.3.1.
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CHART III 
POLYSEMY: 1 Aufhebung*
AUTHORITY
Memorabilia Riddle'Witness
of
statement personal communal
witness memory
1 JokeSite
of
refraction as witness - memory ofA.W.
Statement
as
Witness
witness: ▼memory:
perception 
v s . 
analogy
syntagm 
v s . 
system
' CaseCase III II
different ways of treating one problem.
For example, despite the antitheses, polysemies, and 
collapses noted here (and treated more fully in Case - I), 
various 'case' criteria are presented in the risala: 
attestation by communal memory in the Riddle, and by personal 
witness in Memorabilia. Both of these suppose ‘event*.
Another element necessary to mark ‘event1 is constitution 
of time; and time is an image built up by Jahiz in, roughly, 
three ways.
First, for instance, as part of the constant reference 
to the age of A.W., there is mention of the 'long-lived
w
ones' ( (para. 59) or: time as duration and number.
Secondly, time exists implicitly in the encyclopaedic cit­
ations (tracked down by Pellat) from bedouin to Shi'i material,
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CHART IV
SYNONYMY: Time
§ BY NUMBER BY REFERENCE BY DIFFERENCE
37 duration - number
(vague + unspec­
ified)
opposition to: 
unnamed - named
act: God
38 association with:
a-temporal + verbs 
of time
comparison with: 
persons
association with: 
persons
association with
events: Book 
Arab
(ahistory - history)
39 disappearance
change
appearance
(peoples +
nature)
presumably pre- to post-Islam, or: time situated by reference.
Lastly, time can be associated with God's intervention, as 
in discussion of 'metamorphosis' ( (paras 44 and 204),
or: time as difference. A brief look at paragraphs 37 to 
39 shows these three principles embedded in the usual harangue 
of A.W., in Chart IV.
Thus, like the syntagm, time in the risala is unilinear 
and irreversible. A.W.'s great age brings him close to 
'extinction' ( )  (para. 54). The men mentioned in paragraph 
33 are today's 'companions', and the metamorphosed creatures
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CHART V 
EPISTEMOLOGY - Order
MYTHIC NORMATIVE HISTORIC
Riddle Case Riddle
who-what-when-where norm how-why
Memorabilia Joke Memorabilia
wisdom ab-norm brotherhood
outside time inside fiction inside time
old 'known' authorial ‘known' new 'known'
will have to wait for the 'wonder' ( of the final
metamorphosis (see Joke - II, on para. 204) .
Once more, moving outside the risala into the para­
digmatic, I might mention at least two readings of this
phenomenon. On the one hand, one may see it, like Pellat,
e •]
as material in the Sunni-Shi'i debate. On the other hand,
if the Riddle deals with the mythic, and the Case with the
normative, what remains to be dealt with is Islam as an
historical 'event', as a 'superseding' of a 'superseded'
2
system. For this, unilinear time is essential; God's 
revelation is diachronic. See Chart V.
(b) dis-association
However, corresponding to subversion of polysemy by 
associations with A.W., there is similar subversion of
See Pellat's note on p. 141,
2 Wansbrough, op. cit., p. 43.
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synonymy, namely, constant textual interruptions by mention 
of reader (A.W.), writer (Jahiz), and text (risala).
These two subversions, ambiguity of paradigmatic 
associations, and intervention in syntagmatic associations, 
can be roughly represented as follows, in Chart VI:
CHART VI 
SYNTAX - disorder
INTERFERENCE BY PARADIGMATIC POSSIBILITIES
A.W. A.W. A.W.
1 t
size age knowledge
4- 4-
(attribute) (time) (bases)
1 1 1
religion history epistemology
INTERFERENCE IN SYNTAGMATIC CONTIGUITIES
A.W. Text Jahiz
joking joking joking joking
(per se) r (per se) (per se) (per se)
joked joking Joker
10.2 Subversion - Cohesion
As noted in the introduction, these two elements, 
multiple levels and asides to A.W., have traditionally been 
regarded as disruptive of the coherence of the text. I 
regard them, on the contrary, as the text's primary cohesive
See, in my introduction, the reference to Pellat's, 'deux 
parties qui s'imbriquent 1'une dans 1 1 autre sans aucun plan 
precongu, sans aucun ordre visible', p. XIV.
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elements. Granted, they are 'subversive', and the literary
function of this has been mentioned with reference to the
Mannerist genre. It is upon subversion that predication
depends, however, as noted in this reflection by Ricoeur:
The idea of category mistake brings us closer to our 
goal. Can one not say that the strategy of language 
at work in metaphor consists in obliterating the 
logical and established frontiers of language, in 
order to bring to light new resemblances the previous 
classification kept us from seeing?1
It is this obliteration of previous classification which
Kuhn sees in the paradigmatic changes of science. It is
no less true for the formulation of Islam in ninth-century
Baghdad, and can be found in the expressive roles played
by ambiguity and contradiction, in the creation of 'category
mistake'.
1 0 ~. 2 .1 Ambiguity
Ambiguity in layering of levels can ultimately put in
2
question levels as hierarchical certainties; for instance: 
clear definitions of 'tali' and 'wide', or the categories 
of figurative and literal (see Joke - III on A.W. as 'wide' 
and the Quranic citation using 'wide').
10.2.2 Contradiction
Contradiction by self-reference in a text is often play 
with the certainty of True-False, as in the famous 'All
3
Cretans are liars* spoken by a Cretan (see Joke - I:
Jung writes, 'Non-ambiguity and non-contrad^tion are
4
one sided and thus unsuited to express the incomprehensible.1
_
Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 197 (italics mine).
2 See D. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach (Harmondsworth,
1981), p. 15.
 ^ Ibid., p. 17.
4
C.G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy (London, 1974), p. 16.
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CHART VII
COHERENCE
DISCOURSES EPISTEMOLOGY SYNTAX .
Memorabilia quotation
Direct: Discourse 
on
statement
Riddle question
(external witness
Case I
(internal witness 
attribution - predication Indirect: Discourse 
on
discourse
Case II
Case III perception - analogy
Joke I ab- ^normal
Reversed: Discourse 
on
* descript
Joke II im- ;perf ect
Joke III a- ^marvellous
WITNESS BY STATEMENT STATEMENT AS WITNESS
Expression at all levels is, I think, the subject of this 
risala: expression of what is known, how it is known to be
so, and, perhaps, expression of the 'incomprehensible*. I 
think that, as Jahiz treats it here, it is syntax which 
determines epistemology, as set out in Chart VII.
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